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Dear Mr. Vice President:
I am pleased to forward this Report of the Advisory Committee on
the Redesign of the Space Station. This committee has worked on
its assessment of the redesign since April 22, 1993. It has
assessed the various redesign options developed by NASA's
Station Redesign Team on the basis of technical and scientific
capability, accuracy of projected costs, and structure of
management and operations, The first-level goals for the space
station, as stated in Dr. John Gibbon's letter of April 30, 1993,
served as a guide during this assessment.
Throughout this assignment we have been extremely pleased with
the effectiveness and responsiveness of the Redesign Team. This
diverse and committed group of men and women has performed
in an exemplary manner while executing a complex and difficult
task under severe time constraints. We also wish to note the
cooperative and collegial manner in which our international
partners, representing the Canadian Space Agency, the European
Space Agency, the Science and Technology Agency of Japan, and
the Italian Space Agency, worked with us throughout this
process.
The civil space program and the scientific and technological
advances it makes possible are of urgent importance to a forward-
looking nation. The members of our committee further believe
that there is great intrinsic value in human presence in space.
Yet our civil space program is in need of clear goals and
missions, and we recognize that the pace and intensity of
development, research, and exploration in space must be
carefully scrutinized in light of national budgets and priorities. It
is our firm belief that the Administration and the Congress must
make a clear and long-lived decision regarding the space station.
We hope that this report will be of assistance in reaching that
decision.
Respectfully,
Charles M. Vest

PREFACE
The members of this committee came to this task from
varied backgrounds and experiences in the space pro-
gram, industry, academia, and the military. We accepted
this assignment in the spirit of national service to assist
the Federal government in making basic decisions re-
garding the space station and the civil space program.
We believe in the importance of the exploration of space
by both robotic and human means. We believe that inter-
national cooperation and partnership are important at-
tributes in such undertakings. We believe that human
presence in space has intrinsic value. We believe that it
is possible to predict only partially the scientific, techno-
logical, and human benefits of long-duration residence,
experimentation, and exploration in space.
Yet we also recognize that the pace and intensity of de-
velopment, research, and exploration in space must be
carefully scrutinized in light of national and international
budgets and priorities. In our view, the civil space pro-
gram is a very important national undertaking, but its
priorities must be subjected to careful analysis of costs
and benefits. It is in great need of stability of goals and
budgets. The scope and costs of the space station require
careful and accurate analysis and prioritization.
We hope that this report, which assesses the work of the
Station Redesign Team, will contribute to credible,
timely, clear, and long-lived decision-making about the
future of the space station program.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
AND FINDINGS
Background
n March 9, 1993, the President of
the United States asked NASA to
undertake an effort, of 90 days
duration, to redesign the Space Station
Program in such a manner that major re-
ductions in the projected costs of Space
Station Freedom would be realized. The
President requested that he be provided
with several design options of varying
cost and capability. The Administration
explicitly selected this course of action in
preference to continuing to develop Space
Station Freedom or to canceling plans to
establish a space station altogether.
On March 10, 1993, under the direction of
NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin, the
Station Redesign Team, a hand-picked
group of 45 NASA employees and 10 rep-
resentatives from the international part-
ners for Space Station Freedom,
undertook this demanding task. The
team was assembled, and was led ini-
tially by Dr. Joseph Shea, and subse-
quently by Col. Bryan O'Connor.
On March 25, 1993, Vice President Albert
Gore appointed Dr. Charles Vest to chair
an Advisory Committee on the Redesign
of the Space Station. Sixteen experts
with varied backgrounds and experiences
in the space program, industry, academia,
and the military were appointed to this
Advisory Committee (Appendix A). They
were supplemented by a small number of
additional experts to assist in analyzing
specific aspects of the redesign. The Ad-
visory Committee also worked in close
collaboration with representatives of
NASA's international partners, the Cana-
dian Space Agency, the European Space
Agency, the Science and Technology
Agency of Japan, and the Italian Space
Agency, as ex officio members of the Advi-
sory Committee.
During the work of both the Station Re-
design Team and the Advisory Commit-
tee, the U.S. Office of Science and
Technology Policy issued two important
statements. The first requested that the
Redesign Team consider what viable
space station options that continue to ac-
commodate the international partners
could be delivered at three cumulative-
cost levels for the period Fiscal Year 1994
to Fiscal Year 1998:$5 billion (with a
peak annual funding of $1 billion), $7 bil-
lion (with a peak annual funding of
$1.5 billion), and $9 billion (with a peak
annual funding of $1.8 billion). The sec-
ond was a statement, developed at the re-
quest of the Advisory Committee, of the
Administration's first-level goals for the
space station, and their articulation of
preliminary goals for the overall civil
space program. These statements are in-
cluded in this report as Appendices B and
C. The Advisory Committee's assess-
ments of the redesign options included
consideration of these goals.
The task of the Advisory Committee was
to assess the Station Redesign Team's
recommended designs on three funda-
mental grounds: technical and scientific
capability, accuracy of projected costs,
and structure of management and opera-
tions. In other words, will each redesign
option accomplish its stated objectives;
will the actual costs during the coming
years likely be those projected by the
team; and will the recommended manage-
ment structure be appropriate to accom-
plish the task? The report includes an
independent assessment by the interna-
tional partners.
The Station Redesign Team developed
three basic options, which are described
in detail in their Space Station Redesign
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Team Final Report to the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Redesign of the Space Sta-
tion and in a summary fashion in this
report in the section titled "Description of
the Options." Two of these designs, Op-
tions A and B, are largely derivative of
Space Station Freedom. Both grow over
time in a modular fashion by attaching
elements (solar power panels, heat-rejec-
tion surfaces, habitation and laboratory
modules, experimental packages, and a
robotic servicing system) to a large truss
structure, and also make various uses of
docked space shuttle orbiters. Option C
does not use a truss structure, but in-
stead has as its core element a large pres-
surized cylindrical habitation and
experimentation module that is lofted
into orbit in a single launch. Solar arrays
and heat-rejection surfaces are attached
to this basic element, and various other
modules can be attached to the core as it
evolves. This option draws substantially
on knowledge and technology developed
for the Space Shuttle Program.
Each of the options requires a large num-
ber of space shuttle flights for assembly
and tending, and each evolves to different
stages of development and capability.
Milestones include attainment of human-
tended capability, international presence,
and permanent human capability. A
minimal configuration, a power station,
consisting only of a structure with solar
panels to generate electrical power to
which a space shuttle can be attached, is
possible in Options A and B. This variety
of developmental stages makes a simple
comparison difficult.
Advisory Committee
Organization and Operation
The Advisory Committee was divided into
four subcommittees: Technical and Mis-
sion Assessment (Dr. Albert Wheelon,
Chair), Science, Applications, and Tech-
nology Research Assessment (Dr. Louis
Lanzerotti, Chair), Cost Assessment (Mr.
Jay Chabrow, Chair), and Management
and Operations Assessment (Dr. Mary
Good, Chair).
The Advisory Committee interacted sub-
stantially with the NASA Administrator
and the Redesign Team in an open, can-
did, and collegial manner, while being
careful to maintain its independence and
objectivity.
The entire Advisory Committee held
three two-day meetings, on April 22-23,
May 3-4, and June 7-8, 1993. Typically,
the first day was devoted to public meet-
ings of the full committee reviewing the
status and development of the redesign
options. The second day was spent pri-
marily in subcommittee working sessions.
The subcommittees, and, as appropriate,
individual members, interacted with the
Redesign Team, visited NASA facilities
for in-depth briefing and fact-finding, and
contacted various members of the indus-
trial and academic research communities.
During the course of the assessment ef-
fort, it became important to understand
the baseline design parameters and costs
of Space Station Freedom. To attain this
understanding, the Cost Assessment sub-
committee worked closely with the Rede-
sign Team and with NASA's Independent
Cost Assessment Team. The Committee
also reviewed and utilized the results of
NASA's Requirements Assessment Group
Report, which evaluated the research
community's specifications and needs for
a space station.
Basic Findings
The Committee's key findings in seven ar-
eas of assessment are summarized below.
Additional findings and more detailed
substantive information are included in
the balance of this document.
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General. Several of the findings are ap-
plicable to the assessment of the redesign
activity or the more general question of
an orbiting space station. They are:
The Station Redesign Team was
highly competent, and its work
has been effective in providing the
Advisory Committee and the
President with several design
options covering a range of cost
and capability.
The space station should be con-
sidered as an ongoing, evolving
program of scientific and techno-
logical research conducted in an
orbiting national and international
research laboratory that is part of
the Nation's high-technology
infrastructure.
The space station is an interna-
tional cooperative venture requir-
ing long-term multilateral commit-
ment.
Scientific and technological re-
search and development projects
should be selected for implementa-
tion on the station on the basis of
unique requirements for long-
duration residence in an orbital
environment and the degree to
which human interaction is re-
quired. Scientific knowledge of the
effects of long-duration spaceflight
on humans should be gained as
background for future space explo-
ration.
The Advisory Committee believes
that several considerations of
safety, flexibility, and redundancy
of launch and assured crew return
vehicles argue strongly for launch-
ing the station at an orbital incli-
nation that allows access by as
many spacefaring nations as
possible. An inclination of 51.6 °
would achieve this, and would
enable Russian participation,
thereby potentially reducing costs
and enhancing international
cooperation. Alternative orbits
could also be considered. An
expeditious decision about orbital
inclination is required.
Options. This report discusses the de-
sign options themselves and the criteria
by which they were evaluated. The
Committee's general findings regarding
the options are:
Options A and C are the designs
most deserving of further consider-
ation. Although the general
parameters and assessment of all
options developed by the Redesign
Team are presented, most of the
Committee's work focused on these
two options.
Development limited to the power
station capability is not a worth-
while option for the nation to
pursue. Human-tended capability
is a marginal level of development
because experiments requiring the
presence of crew members would
be limited to a 30-day duration,
greatly reducing the justification
of a space station.
The options differ in the pace at
which they reach various stages of
development, such as when the
various international modules
become integrated.
Cost. The costs of the redesign options,
and of Space Station Freedom, were the
focus of much of the Committee's effort.
Our review of the input, methodology,
and conclusions drawn by the Redesign
Team provides confidence in the realism
of their cost estimates. Our cost analysis
subcommittee received voluminous data
displaying estimating techniques, includ-
Final Report
to the
President
Advisory
Committee
on the
Redesign
of the
Space Station
....... o ....
3
Final Report
to the
President
Advisory
Committee
on the
Redesign
of the
Space Station
Orbital
Inclination
28.8 o
Space Station
Freedom
Baseline
SSF
NASA
Cost
Assessment
Option A Option B Option C
Phases
Power
Station
Human-
Tended
Capability
International
Human-
Tended
Capability
V.S.
Permanent
Human
Capability
$ Date $ Date $ Date $ Date
5.7 Dec 6.3 Nov
1997 1997
10.5 Jul 11.8 Dec
1998 1998
13.4 Jan 16.4 Mar
2000 2001
$ Date
: ::::::! ..... ::::::::
ii:i:i:i:i:i:i:i:::!:!:!:!:!:!:i:i:imi:i:i:i:i:i:i:i:i:i:i:i_i:!:!:i:i:i:i:i:i
:i:i:!:!?!?i:!?!:!:!:L::r::.: !i!i_ili!iiiiiii!!!!!ili_i!i!i!i!i!!i!!!i
_i_iliiiiiiiiiiiiii!iiiiiiiiiiii_ijiiiiiii_iiiiiiiiiiiiiii_i_i_i_iii_!
13.7 Nov
1999
Permanent
Human
Capability
2000 2001 2000 2001
15.1 Jan
2001
* Does not include assured crew return vehicle
= not applicable
Figure 1. Space Station Cumulative Cost and Schedule Comparison
(Real-Year Dollars in Billions)
ing allowances, reserves, and confidence
factors used for specific functions, and the
rationale for costing assumptions. This
documentation and candor gave us confi-
dence that the Redesign Team's estimates
had been prepared in an unbiased and re-
alistic manner and provided our subcom-
mittee with a sound basis for the
assessments presented in this report.
Figure 1 compares the "to go" costs, devel- °
oped by NASA, of each option at reason-
ably comparable stages of development.
Major findings in the cost area are:
Three viable design options were
developed, each of which could be
executed at a significant cost
savings relative to Space Station
Freedom. The cost savings arise
primarily from management
restructuring.
The ultimate cost of a space sta-
tion and its operations will be
minimized only if Congress and
4
the Administration makea firm
commitment to the program and
provide stable funding.
The generallyunderstoodcostsof
SpaceStation Freedomhave
grown substantially over time and
are well in excessof thoseof the
redesignoptions. The costsof
SpaceStation Freedomand the
redesignoptions arecomparedin
this report on asconsistenta basis
as possible.
Noneof the fully implemented
phasesof the three station rede-
sign optionsmeetsthe costtargets
provided by the Administration of
$5billion, $7billion, and $9billion
for FiscalYear 1994through
FiscalYear 1998,nor doesany
option meet the annual funding
target while simultaneously
achievingthe schedulemilestones
desired. All options,however,do
representmajor costsavings
relative to SpaceStation Freedom.
International Partners. The interna-
tional partners' modules are not accom-
modated at the target funding levels.
These modules can be accommodated in
later phases of each option. The Cana-
dian robotic servicing system is not fully
accommodated in either Option A or Op-
tion C.
The Advisory Committee is con-
cerned about the growing percep-
tion of the U.S. as an unreliable
partner in scientific pursuits, as
well as the potential loss of capa-
bility provided by international
investment and technology.
The international partners express
strong reservations about Option
C based on its relative lack of
maturity and programmatic uncer-
tainties. The addition of interna-
tional modules will no longer lead
to the creation of a space station
with greater capabilities.
Risk. The objective assessment of risk to
human life and to the long-term operation
of the space station must be a major ele-
ment in decision making. Determining
factors include the amount of required ex-
travehicular activity by astronauts, the
extent of protection against space debris,
the availability of an assured crew return
vehicle, and the need for alternative
launch vehicle access to the space station.
The Committee's assessment of the rede-
sign options includes such considerations.
An assured crew return capability
must be provided, but was not
accounted for in previous cost
estimates for Space Station Free-
dom.
Development risk (i.e., the prob-
ability of roadblocks and delays in
the development of design, con-
struction, and operation of a space
station) is also an important
consideration and has been as-
sessed to a limited extent by the
Advisory Committee. Develop-
ment risk is affected not only by
the complexity of assembly tasks
evidenced by the amount of on-
orbit assembly required, but also
by such factors as the maturity of
development of designs, equip-
ment, and systems.
All options, as currently presented,
are dependent upon the space
shuttle as the sole launch vehicle.
This is undesirable from the
perspective of programmatic risk,
and carries a large "overhead" in
the form of the shuttle's own mass
of 200,000 pounds when launching
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station components of up to 30,000
pounds per flight. This should be
ameliorated by using an alterna-
tive expendable launch vehicle,
such as the Russian Proton, Euro-
pean Ariane V, or U.S. Titan IV
for lifting the heaviest elements.
Management. The level of cost reduc-
tion will be determined primarily by the
extent of implementation of major struc-
tural changes in the management and or-
ganization of the program within both
NASA and the civilian contractors. This
will require great resolve on the part of
NASA and the Administration.
The NASA Administrator must be
empowered to apply lean manage-
ment and assign the appropriate
skill base to the tasks at hand.
Redundancies and overlapping
responsibilities such as in the
existing Space Station Freedom
management structure must be
eliminated. Management layers
must be reduced, and program
authority and responsibilitymust
reside in the Program Manager.
The Center Directors'rolemust be
to make the assetsoftheir centers
availableto the program, not one
ofprogrammatic control.
A reduction of at least 30 percent
in total civil service and contractor
employees assigned to the Space
Station Program should be imple-
mented following principles of lean
management to gain efficiency and
effectiveness•
The current cost projections for the
options include significant savings
achieved by restructured manage-
ment, but more could be attained
by further organizational changes.
Acquisition. A single prime contractor,
preferably selected from among the cur-
rent major prime contractors for Space
Station Freedom, should be responsible
for total system integration, including
cost, schedule, and performance.
INTRODUCTION
The Space Station Program was initiated
in 1984 to provide for permanent human
presence in an orbiting laboratory. This
program evolved into Space Station Free-
dom, later identified as a component to
facilitate a return of astronauts to the
Moon, followed by the exploration of
Mars.
In March of 1993 the Clinton Administra-
tion directed NASA to undertake an in-
tense effort to redesign the space station
at a substantial cost savings relative to
Space Station Freedom. This task was
undertaken by the Station Redesign
Team, consisting of 45 NASA employees
and 10 representatives of the interna-
tional partners. Numerous candidate sta-
tion concepts were submitted by NASA
Centers, industry, the Space Station
Freedom Program Office, the interna-
tional partners, and individuals. From
these submissions, the Redesign Team
narrowed the field to three basic design
options for detailed study: Option A, a
modular buildup; Option B, derived from
Space Station Freedom; and Option C, a
single-launch core station.
The Advisory Committee on the Redesign
of the Space Station was established in
March 1993 to provide an independent
assessment of the advantages and disad-
vantages of the redesign options. Repre-
sentatives of the international partners
were also asked to serve as ex officio
members of the Advisory Committee.
The Advisory Committee's charter stipu-
lated that it should assess at least three
design options for the new program that
could:
Support long-duration research in
materials and life sciences, but not
necessarily permanently manned.
Achieve initial on-orbit research
capability by 1997 or earlier, with
U.S. development and assembly
complete by 1998.
Maintain opportunities for part-
nership with international part-
ners and consider additional
opportunities for international
cooperation. Consider opportuni-
ties for Russian cooperation and/or
use of Russian capabilities.
Be configured for significantly
lower cost of operations (e.g.,
annual operations costs shall be
significantly reduced below exist-
ing estimates and within the
constraints of the budget).
Greatly reduce on-orbit assembly
and checkout, including major
reductions in required extrave-
hicular activity and the potential
for use of expendable launch
vehicles.
Implement a simplified and effec-
tive program management struc-
ture, including a transition plan
for organizational and contract
changes.
° Provide adequate budget reserves.
Plan for a shorter on-orbit lifetime
(e.g., 10 years extendable to 15
years).
This report describes the results of the
Committee's work. The discussions that
follow first describe the mission that the
Administration has articulated for the
Space Station Program and the scientific
and technical characteristics that a rede-
signed station must possess to fulfill
those objectives. This is followed by a de-
scription of recommended management,
operations, and acquisition strategies for
the redesigned program. The next sec-
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tion, "Assessment of the Options," pre-
sents the Committee's assessment of the
redesign options against five criteria:
technical capabilities, research capabili-
ties, schedule, cost, and risk. A section
on general mission risk is also included.
The report then provides an assessment
of the options by the international part-
ners, and a review of how the Russian
space program could contribute to an in-
ternational space station.
Significant risk is inherent in complex
undertakings, especially in the hazardous
environment of outer space. This chal-
lenging frontier and perhaps progress it-
self cannot be undertaken free of risk, yet
we believe that it is important to
straightforwardly review the factors that
can lead to systems failures or danger to
persons in order to facilitate decisions
and actions that minimize them. There-
fore, in addition to assessing these mat-
ters in our review of the redesign options,
we included the section on General Mis-
sion Risk, a broad discussion of these fac-
tors associated with complex space
missions.
8
MISSION AND
REQUIREMENTS
o effectively assess a redesignedspace station, the Advisory Com-
mittee asked Dr. John H. Gibbons,
the Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, to provide an under-
standing of the Administration's first-
level objectives for the space station.
Although Dr. Gibbons replied that the
Administration was still formulating its
plans for the civil space program, he did
indicate that the Administration intended
"to ensure that all the resources dedi-
cated to the civilian space program are
well-managed and focused on issues that
are critical to the nation." In their view,
the space program should create new
knowledge, contribute to the U.S.
economy, provide opportunities for inter-
national cooperation, and motivate young
people to take an interest in mathematics
and science.
Regarding the space station, Dr. Gibbons
stated that the Administration believed
that the program should accomplish the
following objectives:
Create the capability to perform
significant long-duration space
research in materials and life
sciences;
Develop the technology and engi-
neering skills necessary to build
and operate advanced human and
autonomous space systems;
• Encourage international coopera-
tion in science and technology;
Provide opportunity for new users,
particularly industry users, to
conduct experiments on new,
commercially relevant products
and processes;
Acquire new knowledge regarding
the feasibility and desirability of
conducting human scientific,
commercial, and exploration activi-
ties.
If a space station is developed, its utiliza-
tion will be in the national interest. A
number of advisory bodies have identified
and discussed those discipline areas that
can best be served by research conducted
in a laboratory in space. A space station
will serve as a national and international
laboratory for activities including:
(1) studies of the effects on humans of
long-term presence in space, including
their health and capabilities; (2) engineer-
ing research and technology development
that require experimentation in space in
order to enable or improve appropriate fu-
ture human and robotic space activities;
and (3) scientific studies of the uses and
effects of microgravity on materials sci-
ences, fluid behavior, combustion, and
other phenomena and processes. It is ex-
pected that there will be unanticipated op-
portunities and adjustments as a
station-based research program proceeds.
For example, experiments in life sciences
may contribute to new understanding of
the circulatory system, the nervous sys-
tem, bone and muscle metabolism, and
lead to new medical devices and sensors.
In material sciences, research will contrib-
ute fundamental knowledge important to
the development of advanced materials.
A space station will only serve its re-
search purposes if there is a Research
Manager who has line authority. The Re-
search Manager must have a stable and
protected budget so that the science initia-
tives and laboratory resources of the user
community are protected.
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Many of the science returns that will re-
sult from research on a space station will
come from elucidating the underlying
mechanism of space adaptation. Reach-
ing this goal will require, in some in-
stances, missions of extended duration (6
months or longer) and a minimum crew
complement of four or more.
Some research involving microgravity
payloads may require frequent human
tending, and yet other microgravity
projects may be designated for extended
periods of primarily ground-tended opera-
tions. Program planning, time sharing,
and ease of access would maximize the
utility and efficiency of a space labora-
tory.
"User group" issues such as time in orbit,
number of experiment racks, power, crew
availability, and microgravity levels have
been specified in past reports. For ex-
ample, an overall space station environ-
ment of 14.7 psi, 21 percent oxygen,
carbon dioxide levels (nominal operations)
of 0.3 percent, and zero g and one g, are
required for life sciences research. The
requirements for specialized equipment
such as centrifuges and furnaces will de-
pend strongly upon the research projects
that are prioritized for pursuit. The
prioritization process that determines the
investigations for flight will likely be it-
erative and include as ranking criteria
the subjects to be pursued, the organiza-
tions (government, academic, and com-
mercial entities as well as international
partners) responsible for the investiga-
tions, and the resources available. The fi-
nancial resource limitations in any
station program should motivate the de-
sign and development of innovative
equipment and technology.
Among the possible user groups for a
space station, the commercial sector is
the most difficult to assess. Commercial
uses of a laboratory in space can take
many forms, including collaborations with
NASA-sponsored, university-based orga-
nizations, such as the present Centers for
Commercial Development of Space. Un-
der this arrangement, funds from NASA
are expected to be supplemented by com-
mercial firms, and/or by "in kind" contri-
butions. Research can also be carried out
independently of the commercial develop-
ment centers, with the company interfac-
ing directly with NASA through a Joint
Endeavor Agreement. Other types of
commercial space research range from
those where NASA provides partial to to-
tal funding, to those activities that in-
volve no exchange of funds.
If a space laboratory is a long-term re-
search investment, then how are commer-
cial interests best coupled to it? The
answer is not easy, and is often couched
in terms of political assessments and
views of how government should best be
organized to interact with and foster in-
dustrial/commercial policy. Often it is
said that industry tends to be short-term
oriented (research horizons of perhaps 5
years; possibly 10 in some instances) and
that therefore government (NASA in this
case) needs to pursue the longer-term re-
search that would be provided by a space
laboratory. This is largely the situation
at present where in the case of the Cen-
ters for Commercial Development of
Space, research that might have future
long-term commercial possibilities is
funded by NASA. This requires good
foresight on the part of NASA and its uni-
versity-based commercial centers to an-
ticipate the needs in non-aerospace
commerce some 10 or more years in the
future. Such a long-term assessment is
difficult enough for industry in planning
its own long-term research agenda and
strategies.
A review of the literature on the commer-
cial opportunities available with the
space shuttle and those proposed for a
10
spacestation showsthat manypotential
opportunities wereoversold. Addition-
ally, there hasbeenrelatively little in-
volvementby major, non-aerospace
corporatelaboratories. Although there
hasbeensomewhatintense activity for a
few yearsby a handful of companies,the
interest has largely waned in eachcase.
Reasonsfor the declining interest include
the developmentof morecompetitive
ground-basedprocesses,the lack of as-
sured and frequent accessto space,and
fluctuations in the businessclimate that
affect the levels and directions of research
support. The most recent intense, non-
pharmacologicalresearchconductedfrom
the middeck lockersof the spaceshuttle
was terminated largely in responseto
changesin the economicbusinessclimate
and a reorientation of the company'sre-
searchspending.
Proposedspacestation researchshould
continue to be reviewed and prioritized
externally and internally, as is presently
donefor spacescienceexperimentsby
groupssuchas the National Research
Council and the NASA Advisory Council.
Only thoseresearchprojectsthat canbest
makeuseof the unique attributes of a
spacelaboratoryshouldbeconsideredfor
ultimate flight. An important part of the
prioritization processshould include an
assessmentof the competitivemeansof
accomplishingthe researchobjectives,
whether thesemeansarespace-or
ground-based,or whether they are robotic
or human-tended. In most cases,only
thoseresearchtopics that survive such
competitiveevaluationswould be re-
tained for further considerationfor flight
on the spacestation.
Becauseof the unique opportunities that
aspacestation canprovide for certain re-
searchareas,and becauseof the limita-
tions that will exist for funding and other
resources,the developmentof priorities
shouldbeviewed from a positive perspec-
tive. Sucha processwill ensurethat only
the most appropriate and very best re-
searchis selectedfor flight.
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GENERAL MISSION
CONSIDERATIONS
Launch Vehicle Considerations
he current space station is basedon exclusive use of the space
shuttle for lifting its components
and crew to Earth orbit, as are Options A
and B. Although Option C uses a new
launch vehicle for its large initial load, it
depends on the shuttle to carry the Japa-
nese and European modules and other
heavy outfitting payloads. All three op-
tions plan 50 shuttle flights over 10 years
to supply and refurbish the station. This
exclusive dependence on shuttle is both
unnecessary and undesirable.
There are several problems with a
"shuttle only" policy, and they are appar-
ent in Figure 2. The first problem is ba-
sic lift capability. The shuttle will launch
about 30,000 pounds of useful station
payload into a 28.8 ° orbit. The pressur-
ized laboratory modules are significantly
heavier when fully fitted, and so are a
number of assembly payloads. A second
problem is the high probability that the
shuttle could be grounded again during
the assembly or operational phase of the
station program. The third problem with
shuttle is that it has increasing difficulty
supporting heavy launches into the 51.6 °
orbit, which permits alternative access to
the space station (see station orbit selec-
tion section).
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This problem is displayedin Figure 2.
Shuttle capability falls off rapidly with
increasing inclination, whereasthe capa-
bilities of unmannedrockets like Titan
and Ariane donot. The reasonis
straightforward. Each time we launch a
30,000poundpayloadwith the shuttle,
we must put a 200,000poundvehicle into
orbit. When the inclination is changed,
the small associatedperformancepenalty
for this large vehiclemust all comeout of
the useful payload. In businessterms: a
large fixed overheadrapidly eliminates
the profit. This is not the casewith the
Titan and Ariane, which donot seekto
recoverand reusethe launch hardware.
The RussianProtonvehiclecan lift sig-
nificant payloadsto the 51.6° orbit, but it
is seriouslyhandicappedfor lower incli-
nations by range safety and orbital me-
chanicsconsiderations.
The present shuttle strugglesto place
heavypayloadsinto Earth orbit evenat
the 28.8° inclination. In order to accom-
modateheavy modules,experiment racks
must beunloaded. An alternative is to
developthe lightweight aluminum-
lithium shuttle external tank. Both un-
loading and the lightweight tank are
clearly required to lift the heavy payloads
to the higher inclination orbit in the three
options.
The important messageof Figure 2 is
that it is not necessaryto upgrade the
shuttle if we openup the launchvehicle
role. The large unmannedrocketscan
easily lift the heavy payloadsto the
station's orbit. The large payloadscan
alsobecarried into a 51.6° orbit by the
RussianProton rocket and its various up-
per stages,someof which havebuilt-in
dockingsystems. By openingup the
launchvehicle opportunity to unmanned
vehicles,wealso achievemuch needed
launchdiversity. This would providepro-
tection against longgroundingsof one
particular vehicle. A mixed fleet of
shuttle and expendablelaunch vehiclesis
therefore very desirable.
Assured multiple launch access
should be made a firm require-
ment for the space station.
Assured Crew Return Vehicle
All three options have a firm requirement
for an assured crew return capability--a
space "lifeboat" or "parachute." This is re-
quired to evacuate crew members in case
of illness or accident, or if the station it-
self stops working because of equipment
malfunctions or a catastrophic impact or
if there is an extended shuttle stand
down. When the shuttle is docked at the
station, it provides the capability to "bail
out." However, the shuttle is only present
a small fraction of the time. A separate
assured crew return vehicle carried on the
station at all times is thus required. No
such vehicle is being developed in the
U.S.
Fortunately, there is a solution to this
problem. The Russians have developed
the Soyuz spacecraft, which can easily be
attached to the various station configura-
tions, as an assured crew return vehicle.
The only question is how to transport the
Soyuz capsules to the station and how to
provide a suitable landing area when they
return. The Soyuz capsules must be re-
turned every year or two for refurbish-
ment and returned to the station. If the
station inclination is 28.8 ° , the shuttle
must be refit to carry a modified Soyuz to
orbit in the cargo bay. The shuttle would
also return the Soyuz to Earth for refur-
bishing. When used as an assured crew
return vehicle, the Soyuz would land in
water, or on undesirable terrain. In the
event of such emergency use it is unlikely
that we could deploy the naval forces of
the scale used in Apollo on short notice.
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An assured crew return vehicle is a
firm requirement for space station, and
Soyuz is the only viable contender.
Station Orbit Selection
Russian rockets and the Soyuz spacecraft
are the only man-rated systems now avail-
able for dual human access and assured
crew return. To avail ourselves of this
proven capability, we should change the
station's inclination to 51.6 ° so that its orbit
is achievable from the principal Russian
launch site in Kazakhstan. The clear ad-
vantage of the higher inclination is:
The entire stable of previously
developed Russian launch vehicles
is available--as needed. In par-
ticular, the Soyuz can be used for
alternative crew access, while the
Progress cargo vehicle, which the
Russians have often used to resup-
ply their own stations, will also be
available.
The Soyuz can be launched as an
assured crew return vehicle on its
own tested rocket, rather than
going through a costly adaptation
to shuttle.
If the Soyuz is needed to return
astronauts suddenly, it will have
most of the U.S. and Kazakhstan
in which to make its normal land
recovery.
On the other hand, there is a price to pay
for these advantages. The shuttle cannot
put as much payload into the higher or-
bits as it can into the 28.8 ° orbit as illus-
trated in Figure 3. The offsetting actions
that can reduce or eliminate this loss are
displayed in the other columns. For in-
stance, if a new aluminum-lithium exter-
nal tank is built for shuttle, its payload
would be improved by 7,500 pounds. This
leads to the net payload penalties shown
in the second column. The aluminum-
lithium tank development would cost less
than a single shuttle flight. In addition,
the Shuttle Program Manager carries a
3,500 pound reserve, most of which can
now be prudently converted to useful pay-
load. Assuming 2,000 pounds of the re-
serve for payload lift gives the results in
the third column. Finally, one can as-
semble the heaviest station components
at 175 miles rather than 220 miles as
now planned. The completed assembly
would then be propelled up to the final al-
titude by the station's existing propulsion
system and the spent fuel replaced on a
later flight. This saves another 4,500
pounds for each shuttle flight, leading to
the positive margin shown in the last col-
umn.
NASA should proceed with the
development of the aluminum-lithium
lightweight tank.
The Russians now routinely launch from
Baikonur, which has a latitude of 45.6 °, to
an orbit inclination of 51.6 ° to avoid drop-
ping the main stage or an aborted space-
craft in China or Mongolia. They pay a
payload penalty to do so. This orbit inclina-
tion is satisfactory for the Russian rockets,
supply vehicles and return capsules.
We recommend an inclination of
51.6 °. The choice of this orbit would
also make the space station
accessible to Russian launches, and
to vehicles launched from Japanese
and Chinese sites.
Communications
The present space station design and its
three alternatives now depend exclusively
on NASA's own Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite System (TDRSS) communication
satellites for all of their communication
services. It is dangerous and unnecessary
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Figure 3. Payload Increases and Decreases Relative
to Nominal 28.8 ° Orbit Inclination Launching
to do so. There are almost 100 communi-
cations satellites in the same synchronous
orbit where TDRSS resides. All of them
provide wide-band communication ser-
vices. In addition, our international part-
ners maintain data relay satellites on
orbit. Using such spacecraft, over 10,000
ships at sea now have two-way satellite
service. Television is received directly by
millions of households with small back-
yard antennas. Corporate locations and
chain stores are increasingly linked to-
gether by small on-premise satellite ter-
minals. It is a simple matter to add a
second type of satellite dish to the station
configuration. If we do so, we can estab-
lish important redundancy for the com-
munication links that are vital to crew
safety and station operations. Scientific
work would also benefit from alternate
communication routes.
there is no appreciable difference in the
cost to go between the options, except for
the Data Management System.
The option designer had three choices:
select space shuttle derived systems, or
select systems from other space pro-
grams. The only way to save cost at the
subsystem level is to delete capability.
Since many subsystem capabilities are
locked in by fundamental requirements
and safety considerations, savings are dif-
ficult to achieve.
The data management systems for the
three options are quite different---and so
are their costs. Because they represent
an important distinguishing feature, the
data management system capability will
be discussed for each option in the section
titled "rechnical Capability Comparison."
We recommend an alternate com-
munication pathway be included
in the space station.
Subsystem Comparison
It is instructive to compare the three de-
sign options with respect to their sub-
systems: life support, power,
communication, etc. For these systems,
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MANAGEMENT,
OPERATIONS,
AND ACQUISITION
Management and Operations
he current management approachfor the Space Station Freedom
Program is not working at maxi-
mum efficiency, and the fix to this prob-
lem will require leadership. A
streamlined organization will produce sig-
nificant program savings and perhaps
more importantly, a flexible organization
capable of firm, high-quality, and expedi-
tious decision-making with clear lines of
authority and responsibility. Early detec-
tion of and response to problems, cost
containment, and adherence to schedules
should also be expected. The principles
articulated below represent the minimum
changes in management that will be re-
quired for the Space Station Program to
be successful.
For all options, modern, lean manage-
ment principles will need to be embraced
by both the space station's management
and operations organizations. With effec-
tive leadership, this new management
and oversight structure will be effective
in delivering NASA's objectives, in con-
trast to the many-layered, interlaced or-
ganization presently in place.
The revised management structure must
have clearly defined lines of authority
and responsibility for all positions, includ-
ing the management provided by outside
contractors. Particular attention needs to
be given to the program office Associate
Administrator, the Space Station Pro-
gram Manager, Stage Managers, and
other management staff. The Redesign
Team recommended three layers of man-
agement between the station program
manager and the teams responsible for
the launch packages. The Committee be-
lieves this could be reduced to two layers
as shown in Figure 4.
A space station provides a research capa-
bility for those activities that require the
characteristics of the space environment
for their pursuit. As such, the research to
be carried out must be viewed as an inte-
gral part of the station program manage-
ment from the very beginning, and
throughout the design, construction, and
operations phases. Indeed, the operations
phase, which exists explicitly to enable
research, continues throughout the life of
the station. Therefore, in view of the re-
search purposes of the station, we believe
that the "Research Manager" should be a
line activity rather than a staff function.
Ultimately, utilization activities should
be considered along with hardware devel-
opment and operational protocols. As a
line function, the manager will ensure
that all aspects of the research--from
planning and selection to flight and data
analysis---are given the attention and
support that are necessary to ensure mis-
sion success. This proposed organization
also gives the Space Station Program
Manager the responsibility to solve trade-
offs during the development and opera-
tions phases and provides for "life cycle
oversight" rather than isolated "event" or
"phase" management.
The Committee recommends that NASA
maintain an independent oversight and
authority function to validate all safety
issues during the development and opera-
tions phases. However, independent veri-
fication and validation of software should
be a contractor requirement.
To avoid the "turf' battles of the past and
to provide the high-level NASA accep-
tance of the new management structure,
the role of the NASA Center Directors in
the space station organization must be
clearly defined. The role of each Director
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NOTE: MANAGEMENT ROLES
• Associate Administrator: Assures that the Program Manager
has the necessary resources to execute the program.
• Program Manager: Responsible and accountable for all
aspects of program execution (performance, cost, schedule).
• Stage Manager: Responsible for the design, build, test, and
integration of the various system components.
• Operations Manager: Responsible for mission planning,
mission execution, and logistical support.
• Research Manager: Responsible for utilization planning,
experimental hardware design, and research execution.
Figure 4. Recommended Space Station Program Organization Structure
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should not be to provide the management
for the overall program, but to provide
the resources (personnel and facilities)
necessary for the success of the program.
The single most important responsibility
of the Center Directors is to provide the
best-qualified personnel for the project in
a timely manner. This necessitates that
the Center Directors be supportive of the
streamlined management and operations
organization, and that competition and
overlap between Centers are eliminated.
This revised role for Centers is critical to
the success of the recommended program,
and the NASA Administrator must take
whatever action is necessary to assure
that the Directors support and fully em-
brace the streamlined structure. The Re-
design Team's recommendation of a
NASA Headquarters level space station
"Board of Directors" includes the Direc-
tots as members. This is a good vehicle
for providing the Center Directors with
both an advisory role and a continuing
current source of information on what re-
sources they need to provide to the sta-
tion program. In addition, the "Board of
Directors" should include the full partici-
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pation of the international partners to en-
sure that policy issues affecting them are
worked out at this level.
During the development and operations
phases, there should be close integration
between the Shuttle and the Space Sta-
tion Program Offices. This cooperation is
essential for the success of the redesign,
and would provide savings in excess of
those projected in this report. The Com-
mittee, however, is uncomfortable with
the Redesign Team's recommendation to
merge the programs if Option C is cho-
sen. The track record of the Space
Shuttle Program would suggest that the
management and operations principles
outlined above should be employed for
an__n_xoption chosen. The Space Station
Program Manager, who has both the re-
sponsibility and authority to optimize the
overall station development and utiliza-
tion, must not be burdened with the over-
all shuttle issues, even though the two
programs are intertwined.
The principles outlined above are gener-
ally in agreement with the Redesign
Team's recommendations. However, the
Committee believes that the Team's esti-
mate of a $300 million per year savings
due to these management and operations
changes is a minimum gain. Their report
indicates that NASA has 2,300 full-time
equivalent civil servants "helping" the
contractor with over 500 engineering
working groups, panels, and boards. This
complexity causes the contractors to have
a corresponding network to respond to
the government oversight and paperwork
analysis. The Redesign Team believes
that "lean" management will reduce over-
sight requirements by 80 percent and re-
duce the contractor "paperwork" cadre
costs by 10 to 20 percent, and that NASA
managers project a reduction of 25 to
50 percent of the civil servants needed to
perform their functions. The "entitle-
ment" from these improvements could re-
alize a savings of up to the $700 million
to $1 billion range per year for NASA
overall.
NASA should staff the program with the
best people with the appropriate skills re-
gardless of whether they are civil ser-
vants or contractor personnel. Without
the full and enthusiastic support of NASA
senior management, it will be very diffi-
cult to effect the magnitude of suggested
change that is required. As a functioning
Senior Management Team, the Center Di-
rectors and the Associate Administrators
have the power to define the roles and
missions of the Centers and to distribute
work in a way that maximizes program
performance while still satisfying geopo-
litical realities and constraints. This re-
quires an atmosphere of cooperation and
trust and willingness to sacrifice for the
larger good of the Agency. The Redesign
Team's recommendations for the organi-
zation of Integrated Product Teams will
deliver the cost savings. In order to en-
sure maximum efficiency, the Product
Teams must include representation from
all necessary disciplines and the interna-
tional partners.
The Advisory Committee defines opera-
tions as the "single program cost account
that pays all program cost from the time
that flight hardware is delivered in any
form to the Kennedy Space Center for
pre-launch processing." However, the
space station program is a continuum, as
illustrated in Figure 5 where the develop-
ment phase moves smoothly into the utili-
zation phase. As timelines are met,
development costs will go down, and op-
eration costs will increase. As the station
begins to function, operation costs should
level off, and utilization costs associated
with the sciences and technology activi-
ties should grow. Thus, the total program
costs will peak before "first flight" and
come to some equilibrium in the utiliza-
tion phase.
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The station should be viewed as an or-
bital laboratory. Therefore, the develop-
ment costs will never fall to zero, and the
utilization costs will reflect the quality
and type of science and technology activi-
ties chosen worthy of funding. Thus, the
Committee believes that the management
structure outlined above is applicable for
the entire life-cycle of the station. Addi-
tional comments on operations are shown
below.
The first priority of the operations
management is "to maintain the
health and safety of the space
station crew and the integrity of
the space station."
NASA has the fundamental capa-
bilities necessary to execute the
operations program; however, the
station's management structure
must be streamlined.
After safety, the priority of the
operations management is to
provide the station researchers
with the most user-friendly, pro-
ductive laboratory possible within
appropriate budget restraints.
Acquisition Strategy
The Committee concurs with the Station
Redesign Team's acquisition strategy of
the selection of a single prime contractor
with appropriate designated subcontrac-
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tors. This will require the termination of
certain existing contracts and the re-ori-
entation of others.
The station program will be best
served (in timing and cost) by selecting
a single prime contractor. This con-
tractor should be selected from one of
the current major primes, with di-
rected subcontractors. The prime
would be responsible for total system
integration, including cost, schedule,
and performance.
It is noteworthy that in visits to partici-
pating contractors, there was a strong
willingness to work together and a prefer-
ence expressed that one contractor be se-
lected as Prime/Integrator and that the
other contractors work as subcontractors
to the prime.
Options A, B, and C require strong cen-
tralized program management rather
than diffuse involvement by three centers
and three prime contractors, which has
been almost universally identified as the
major management and acquisition issue
to date. A single prime contractor would
facilitate decisive action, reduce cost and
delay, and improve communication
among space station participants.
The timing and execution of the termina-
tion action are critical to programmatic
success. Clearly, a program of the dollar
magnitude and technical complexity of a
space station, which is significantly re-
structured, must be carefully planned and
executed. The Station Redesign Team's
approach is credible, and it provides ap-
propriate guidance for the transition to
the redesigned space station.
The three prime contracts and many of
the subcontracts are cost plus award fee.
This approach should be continued with
an award fee that is made up of two
parts: a short-term part for maintaining
momentum of the planned program; and
a long-term portion to reward final satis-
factory completion of significant station
program objectives. The short-term
award should be on a 6-month review of
agreed-upon progress toward program
events. This incentive will support the
ongoing plan to achieve the long-term ob-
jectives. The long-term award should be
based on the completion of major program
objectives as defined by specific design
parameters, performance, schedule, and
cost. To maintain the focus and pace of
the program, the Space Station Program
Manager must be the award-fee official.
The Committee endorses the Station Re-
design Team's recommendation of a dedi-
cated transition and implementation
team to take ownership of the Space Sta-
tion Program and the necessary acquisi-
tion issues associated with the redesign.
This team should be the restructured
management team outlined earlier in this
section.
2O
DESCRIPTION
OF OPTIONS
hree station redesigns were devel-oped; they are termed Options A,
B, and C. Options A and B are
largely derivative of Space Station Free-
dom. Both grow over time in a modular
fashion through several phases of capabil-
ity, as shown in Figure 6. Option C does
not grow in a modular fashion; it has a
large pressurized cylindrical habitation
and experimentation module that is lofted
into orbit in a single launch. Therefore,
its first phase is U.S. permanent human
capability. Seven additional assembly
flights are required to achieve permanent
human capability, which includes the in-
ternational modules.
Option A
Option A introduces new designs, as well
as modifications and rearrangements of
Space Station Freedom elements. It re-
sembles a scaled-down version of Free-
dom, with solar arrays stretching out
from a central truss structure (Figure 7).
The Station Redesign Team has formu-
lated two similar versions of Option A.
The first, termed Option A-l, incorporates
Bus-l, a Department of Defense propul-
sion boost and attitude control system
built by Lockheed Missiles and Space
Company. Option A-2 is essentially iden-
tical to A-1 in all aspects except it uses
the Space Station Freedom propulsion
modules instead of the Bus-1.
Option A draws heavily from Space Sta-
tion Freedom elements. Starting with the
Freedom base, the Station Redesign
Team deleted hardware, made simplifica-
tions, and applied cost-effective substitu-
tions from other programs. For example,
the design deletes some truss sections,
uses a common core/laboratory module
rather than a node plus laboratory, sim-
plifies the electrical power and data man-
agement systems, and uses a smaller
airlock. The shuttle orbiter provides hu-
man habitability support in early phases.
The modular approach for this option in-
corporates four buildup phases. The first
phase is the Power Station: an orbiting
source of electrical power to which a
shuttle could dock. A crew of five would
live and conduct experiments in the
shuttle for nearly a month. The Power
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OPTION A OPTION B OPTION C
Power Station Power Station
Human-Tended Capability Human-Tended Capability
International Human- International Human-
Tended Capability Tended Capability
Permanent Human
Capability
Permanent Human
Capability
U.S. Permanent Human
Presence Capability
Permanent Human
Capability
* Option C has an earlier U.S. Permanent Human Capability
Note: Permanent Human Capability includes international accommodation
Figure 6. Space Station Redesign Option Capability Phases
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Figure 7. Option A - Permanent Human Capability
Station provides 23 kW of power through
one set of solar arrays and requires three
assembly flights.
During the second phase, Human-Tended
Capability, a common core/laboratory
module is added and provides capability
for 30-day crew stays. This phase pro-
vides 23 kW of power and requires four
assembly flights.
International Human-Tended Capability
is the third phase, which adds a second
set of solar arrays to provide 46 kW of
power and requires nine assembly flights.
This phase completes the addition of all
the international modules.
Permanent Human Capability is the
fourth phase. A third set of solar arrays
increases power to 57 kW. A total of 13
assembly flights ultimately add an
airlock, closet module, and two Russian
Soyuz spacecraft that serve as assured
crew return vehicles.
Option B
Option B (Figure 8) is a direct evolution
of the current Space Station Freedom de-
sign with a modified data management
system and communications and tracking
systems and minor modifications to the
environmental control and life support
system and the thermal control system.
Option B features four buildup phases.
The first phase is the Power Station,
which is achieved in two assembly flights.
This phase provides up to 23 kW of power
to the shuttle for running Spacelab ex-
periments and extending stay times.
22
Figure 8. Option B - Permanent Human Capability
The second phase, Human-Tended Capa-
bility, features a fully operational node
and U.S. laboratory, the mobile servicing
system, the EVA airlock, and two addi-
tional truss segments. Human-Tended
Capability can support payload opera-
tions with or without the shuttle. The
configuration also allows docking of two
shuttles simultaneously, which can ex-
tend crew time on orbit.
The third phase is International Human-
Tended Capability. At its completion,
this phase features a full complement of
U.S. and international partner laborato-
ries and elements. The configuration
supports crew science experiment opera-
tions during shuttle visits, and untended
science between shuttle missions.
The final assembly phase adds the habi-
tation module and two Soyuz assured
crew return vehicles to establish Perma-
nent Human Capability, which supports a
crew of four.
Option C
Option C (Figure 9) is a hybrid station
which utilizes systems and infrastructure
from the Space Shuttle Program and
Space Station Freedom. Option C is an
integrated system with a launch configu-
ration that includes the single core sta-
tion module, the aft fuselage from an
orbiter, space shuttle main engines, a
transition section for adapting the aft fu-
selage geometry to the core module, and
aerodynamic fairings (e.g., shroud, nose
cone) mated with the basic space shuttle
external tank and standard solid rocket
boosters.
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Figure 9. Option C - Permanent Human Capability
The components of Option C are exten-
sively integrated and verified prior to
launch. After one shuttle visit, Option C
has the capability of a human-tended sta-
tion. A second shuttle flight establishes
U.S. Permanent Human Capability. Al-
though humans can permanently inhabit
the station, the international laboratories
are not present. When the international
modules are brought up, Permanent Hu-
man Capability is established. The last
phase is the incorporation of an auxiliary
power module, which completes the sta-
tion about a year after the first launch.
The distinctions of Option C are the phas-
ing of capability and the reliance on many
shuttle-derived systems. During launch
and ascent, the vehicle must function as a
part of the launch system. This drives
the design to include many of the
shuttle's systems for attitude control, pro-
pulsion, communications, and data man-
agement. Once in orbit, these systems
are augmented by the power, crew health,
and environmental control systems de-
rived from Space Station Freedom and
the space shuttle. The design of Option C
mixes Freedom and shuttle systems as
appropriate, in an effort to minimize de-
velopment cost and risk of both the
launch and orbital phases. However,
since the Orbiter Columbia must be de-
commissioned to provide the aft fuselage
for this option, NASA's shuttle fleet will
be reduced to three.
Option C can quickly support permanent
human occupancy by a crew of four. The
92-foot-long, 23-foot diameter module is
divided into seven decks, offering the
most pressurized volume of any options.
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ASSESSMENT
OF THE OPTIONS
his section discusses the Advisory
Committee's assessment results. It
is not possible to individually as-
sess the many elements of a system as
complex as a space station. Therefore,
the Committee developed a high-level set
of evaluation criteria against which each
of the options was measured. The evalua-
tion criteria reflect the consideration of
several factors: the objectives articulated
by the Administration, scientific research
and technical capabilities requirements
as guided by external advisory groups,
and ability to meet cost, schedule, and
other guidelines that formed the frame-
work of the redesign effort.
Comparing the options requires both
broad qualitative and detailed quantita-
tive perspectives. The several phases
within each option compose a very exten-
sive set when all possibilities are consid-
Create the capability to perform
significant long-duration space
research in materials and life sciences.
Develop the technology and
engineering skills for building and
operating advanced human and
autonomous space systems.
Encourage international cooperation
in science and technology.
Provide opportunity for new users,
particularly industry users, to conduct
experiments on new, commercially
relevant products and processes.
Acquire new knowledge regarding the
feasibility and desirability of
conducting human scientific,
commercial and exploitation activities.
ered. In the qualitative approach, the op-
tions and their constituent phases are dif-
ferentiated by how well they support the
five fundamental and principal objectives
of the space station, as derived from the
Office of Science and Technology Policy
guidance letter of April 30, 1993 (Figure
10). Some of these purposes intrinsically
conflict with others, so none of the options
(or Space Station Freedom) is perfect in
satisfying all requirements.
In the remainder of this section, the Com-
mittee presents its assessment of the re-
design options against the following
evaluation criteria: technical capabilities,
research capabilities, schedule, cost, and
risk. The previous section included brief
descriptions of the three options, which
provide the framework for the assessment
information. This section then concludes
with a summary of assessment results.
Technical Capability Comparison
This section compares the three options
in terms of fundamental technical capa-
bilities. A detailed matrix of space station
capabilities is provided in Appendix D.
Our first recommendation deals with the
power station configuration. The Station
Redesign Team report includes a power
station configuration in Options A and B.
Because of limitations on crew time on or-
bit, this configuration would be of little
utility. The benefit of the power station
configuration as a stopping point does not
support the cost of its development.
The power station should not be con-
sidered as a configuration stopping
point in Options A and B, and the
Advisory Committee has not evalu-
ated it further.
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OPTION A
This option is an engineering simplifica-
tion of the baseline Space Station Free-
dom. The elimination of the two U.S.
nodes has simplified the pressurized vol-
umes. Many of the subsystems, including
data management, software, electrical
power, thermal systems, and pressurized
modules have also been simplified.
In particular, the data management sys-
tem of Option A is a desirable simplifica-
tion of the baseline Space Station
Freedom system. It has replaced two data
bus systems, one specially made for Free-
dom, with two identical standardized sys-
tems. The revised system has also
replaced two distinct processors with one
common standardized processor. The
software design has eliminated many of
the high-level software service functions
intended to support research, but which
are of uncertain actual value. Interfaces
are largely preserved, and, where
changed, have been simplified. Finally,
the system eases integrated verification
of the data management and other hard-
ware subsystems. The downsizing of the
Option A data management system, as
compared with the baseline program,
should be considered "right sizing." It
has maintained much of the important
capability, is based on reasonably up-to-
date technology, and has reduced cost and
much of the remaining development risk.
Two variants of Option A were proposed.
A-1 includes the Bus-l, a derivative of a
classified satellite program, which would
supply propulsion and attitude control
functions. A-2 uses Freedom baseline
station- derived hardware for these func-
tions. The discriminators between A-1
and A-2 are subtle. Both are technically
feasible, and are not differentiated in the
Committee's recommendations. Option
A-1 and A-2 have the same assembly se-
quences and schedule. A-1 has inferior
attitude control capability compared to A-
2, but it is sufficient. The concept of inte-
grating Bus-1 is somewhat immature. If
Bus-1 were provided at no cost by the
owner agency, then A-1 would have a
very slight cost advantage over A-2; were
this not the case then A-2 would have a
$600M cost advantage. Option A-2 has
only single fault tolerance during con-
struction. A-1 has the advantage of fewer
EVA hours required for maintenance and
has multiple redundancy in attitude con-
trol functions during assembly. Both fea-
tures factor in reducing operational risk.
A-1 has poorer but acceptable perfor-
mance, and lower operational risk. A-2
has slightly better performance, but
greater operational risk.
The capabilities and benefits of Option A
grow significantly through the four
phases, and the additional cost to com-
plete the later phases is relatively small.
Human-tended capability represents a
substantial fraction of the development
cost of permanent human capability, but
much less than 50 percent of its ultimate
capability. The addition of the interna-
tional modules represents little develop-
ment cost to the U.S., and offers
significant enhancements to the station's
research capability. "Finishing" the port
side of the station and habitation module
mostly requires recurring equipment,
which is much less expensive than the de-
velopment cost already incurred. Thus,
the cost/benefit ratio of Option A is least
attractive at human-tended capability
and most attractive at permanent human
capability.
Option A is a fully capable space sta-
tion. If it is selected, the Advisory
Committee recommends completion
of Option A through permanent hu-
man capability from a technical and
cost / benefit perspective.
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OPTION B
Option B is the design most closely de-
rived from Space Station Freedom. Ex-
cept for minor changes, the phasing of
capabilities and subsystems is the same.
This provides two advantages. The hard-
ware is at a maturity level corresponding
approximately to the Critical Design Re-
view (i.e., mostly designed, with proto-
types tested). Additionally, the baseline
station is highly capable. Its design has
evolved after years of engineering review
and iteration with the research commu-
nity.
The data management system of Option
B has largely maintained the baseline of
Space Station Freedom, which is an ex-
tremely complex, state-of-the-art system.
It has two data bases, one fiber optic ring,
and two levels of processors, distinct but
with similar functionality. The software
is extremely flexible, but costly. It argu-
ably has too much capability for the cur-
rently perceived mission of the station,
and presents significant schedule and
cost risks in the development phase.
The cost benefit arguments made for Op-
tion A also apply to Option B. A great
deal of the cost is incurred by the human-
tended phase, with a smaller fraction of
the benefit achieved. In terms of its sys-
tem capability, Option B at permanent
human presence has a highly capable and
pervasive data system, with the ability of
nearly autonomous function. As in Op-
tion A, the systems are capable of being
monitored, and of evolution and growth.
The robotics capability is highly devel-
oped in Option B, with the manipulator
mounted on a mobile transporter. The at-
titude of Option B is always fixed with
reference to the Earth, aiding observation
and microgravity research.
In terms of capability, the disadvantages
of Option B are the results of the larger
number of EVA hours, which reduces pro-
ductive crew time for research, and the
smaller number of external payload at-
tachment sites, due to the requirements
for the mobile transporter of the robotic
arm.
Option B, the closest derivative of the
Space Station Freedom, is a complex and
highly capable space station. It may,
however, carry unnecessary system com-
plexity in order to provide this capability.
In view of its reduced complexity,
lower number of assembly flights,
EVA assembly and maintenance re-
quirements, earlier permanent hu-
man capability, and relative overall
capability, Option A is preferred for
a modular buildup station over
Option B.
OPTION C
Option C is distinctive in concept from
the baseline station and from Options A
and B in that its capabilities accumulate
in a different pattern. Option C has the
largest inhabited volume and number of
experiment racks. Because few of its sys-
tems are mounted on the exterior of the
station, less EVA maintenance is re-
quired, and therefore 10 to 15 percent
more crew time is available for research.
Because of its diameter, Option C has the
potential for a larger centrifuge for life
science, although this is not included in
the proposed program.
As a single core station, Option C does
not evolve through phases. All basic sys-
tems are checked out prior to launch, and
operating capability is realized when the
astronauts arrive. Bringing on the inter-
national modules involves very little in-
crease in U.S. cost. The addition of a
power module is a several hundred mil-
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lion dollar item and is part of the pro-
posal. In view of the small additional
costs, there is no compelling reason to
consider stopping Option C before inter-
national permanent human capability.
Because of its shuttle systems heritage
and single core approach, Option C has
some capability limitations. It has re-
stricted exterior space for attached pay-
loads and has the least capable data
management system. The data manage-
ment system of Option C is understand-
ably driven by the requirements of the
launch phase to be based on shuttle com-
ponents. However, once on orbit, Option
C carries a performance penalty in capa-
bility, by virtue of its reliance on older
technology and shuttle-unique systems.
The system has a shuttle-unique data bus
and a shuttle-unique (vintage 1980) pro-
cessor. The system software is written in
a language unique to the shuttle. Imma-
ture definition of interfaces with user, in-
ternational, and Freedom-derived
systems may lead to eventual system
growth, with a commensurate risk of cost
growth.
Option C has fragile radiators and solar
arrays, which limits orbiter operations in
the proximity of the station. The limited
data system includes less pervasive in-
strumentation to monitor and character-
ize the engineering functions. In terms of
attitude, Option C must make a compro-
mise. Choices include an attitude such
that the solar arrays point at the Sun,
which provides more electrical power but
poorer microgravity and viewing, or an
attitude oriented towards Earth, which
provides less power.
Option C need not incur a tradeoff be-
tween attitude (microgravity environ-
ment) and power. With a simple "drag
make-up" system, the microgravity envi-
ronment near the center of mass can be
controlled to better than 0.1 microgravity
on all axes. If a biased constraint value
(say 0.5 microgravity) is desired, it could
also be obtained. Such a system would
use 12 thrusters with about 0.1 pounds
capability. It is being designed by engi-
neers at the Johnson Space Center, but is
not yet in the baseline.
Option C is a capable space station,
but somewhat less capable than Op-
tions A and B. If selected, Option C
should be carried to its full power
capability at permanent human
capability.
GROWTH CAPABILITY OF OPTIONS
The potential for growth in scientific and
engineering experiments to be conducted
on the station is significant. It is quite
clear that the results of experiments now
scheduled cannot be anticipated, and,
therefore, the follow-up tests that will
naturally flow from success or surprise
cannot be planned. More fundamentally,
biological and physical sciences are mov-
ing so rapidly that the ability to modify,
enhance, and replace experiments be-
comes an essential feature that the sta-
tion provides.
The redesign options respond differently
to this need for growth capability. Op-
tion C provides considerable interior
growth and flexibility with its large pres-
surized volume of 1117 cubic meters.
However, the opportunities for external
experiment growth are quite limited. By
contrast, the two options most closely re-
lated to the baseline design, Options A
and B, have the reverse characteristic.
They have less growth capability in their
smaller pressurized volume, 760 and 878
cubic meters respectively, but have sub-
stantial opportunities for exposed experi-
ments on their extended truss structure.
Exploiting this capability requires robot-
ics, which are quite strong in Option B, or
additional EVA. However, because EVA
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is limited, and most currently planned ex-
periments donot seekexposureto the ex-
ternal environment, initial growth
capability favors Option C. A further
complicatingfactor, however, is that Op-
tion C's additional capacityis limited in
its utility by a shortageof available
power,which cannot beprovided aseasily
as for the other two options. OptionsA
andB offer the potential for evolutionary
growth with the addition of more labora-
tory modulesand power capability after
permanenthuman presence.
Internal growth capability favors
Option C, and exterior growth
needs favor Options A and B. Thus,
growth capability is not a strong dis-
criminator.
Science, Technology,
and Engineering Research
When assessing the capabilities of the
several redesign options, it is important
first to evaluate the considerations and
assumptions that have produced the "re-
quirements" by which each of the options
are being evaluated. The "requirements"
must follow from those research investi-
gations that have survived the
prioritizations and competitive evalua-
tions as discussed in the Mission and Re-
quirements section. This is even more
critical for a redesigned station, where
important savings in costs are being
sought, and where unnecessary require-
ments could drive costs in an unaccept-
able direction. In a redesigned program,
the redesign of key pieces of research
hardware should also be considered in or-
der to achieve possible savings in the re-
quirements for energy demand, volume,
etc. It is important that in a redesign,
the addition of requirements above those
in the present Space Station Freedom
Program should be carefully monitored.
The Station Redesign Team effort consid-
ered the total planned and ongoing NASA
research programs in microgravity and
life sciences, as well as in engineering re-
search and in the ongoing commercial
programs. Hence, there is, in the rede-
sign program plan and its costing, sub-
stantial use of Spacelab capabilities,
shuttle "utilization" flights to the station
(some of which may be shared with outfit-
ting or logistics flights), and research co-
operation with Russia on the Mir space
station. The following payloads are
among the key ones included for the
highest priority research objectives:
(a) Space Station Furnace Facility--
launch 1998
(b) Fluid Physics Dynamics Facility--
launch 1999
(c) Gravitational Biology Facility--
Spacelab research, to transition to
station
(d) Human Research Facility--
Spacelab research, to transition to
station
(e) 2.5 m centrifuge and habitat hold-
ing facility--launch 2004 (rotor to
be launched as part of station de-
sign in Option C)
(f) Spacecraft Materials and Coatings
Facility--launch 1999
(g) Generic commercial/technology
payloads
The stated redesign plans for the develop-
ment of the facilities, especially the
microgravity facilities, make maximum
use of NASA laboratory personnel and
equipment.
Not included in this list are laboratory
support equipment for the station and
equipment for research on Mir in support
of the overall research program. Also not
Final Report
to the
President
Advisory
Committee
on the
Redesign
of the
Space Station
29
Final Igeport
to the
President
Advisory
Committee
on the
Redesign
ofthe
Space Station
Crew Size I
Max. On-Orbit Crew d/yr
Research Crew Hr/yr
Power to Users, kW orbit
average
Environment 3
02 %
CO2 %
psia 5
Voltage 6, VDC
Racks to Users 7
User Racks < 1 microgravity
User Racks < 2 microgravity
External Attach Sites 9
1
Option A
IHTC PHC
4 4
80 365
1444 6724
Option B
IHTC PHC
4 4
80 365
1370 6566
Option C SSF
IPHP PHC PHC
4 4 4
365 365 365
6884 6866 6566
18 31 41 40 14/372 26/55 2 34
21 21 21 21
0.54 0.54 0.64 0.64
14.7 14.7
28/120 28/120
72 72
40 40
72 72
14 14
14.7 14.7
120 120
49 46
16/218 29
31/388 45
15 15
21
0.74
14.7
120
46
29
45
14
21 21
0.54 0.64
14.7 14.7
120 120
39 39
0/298 8
14/398 36
17 21
An 8-person crew at permanent human presence has been recommended in a National
Research Council report
2 Local Vertical/Solar Inertial
3 No closed life support system in any option
4 A 0.3% CO2 composition has been recommended by the NASA Aerospace Medicine
Advisory Committee, and is achievable for all options on a periodic basis
5 The pressure may decrease to 10.2 psia during EVA activities
6 Voltage conversions on a rack-by-rack basis
7 Acceleration mapping system included as station-supplied in all options
8 Orbiter attached/unattached
9 Utility of attached sites depends upon particular option
Figure 11. Comparison of Options: Research Resources
included is the "development of life sup-
port and medical care capabilities [which
were] incorporated [and budgeted] as sub-
systems in each option." In this latter ac-
tivity area, there is likely to be
considerable overlap between station life
support and medical care capabilities and
important research related to the capa-
bilities of humans in long-duration space
flight. The management of these two as-
pects of the space station program needs
to take into account the overlap and syn-
ergism of these two areas of human space
flight so that the maximum in scientific
understanding can be achieved.
In terms of the first priority research ob-
jectives with a space station, orbital incli-
nations between 28.8 and 51.6 degrees
are satisfactory.
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OPTION A
When the shuttle is attached to this op-
tion prior to and at international human-
tended capability, the center of the 1
micro-g ellipse will be located in the
shuttle bay. The microgravity resources
are listed in Figure 11. The acceleration
features during human tending, as well
as during permanent human capability,
could pose some limitations on the nature
and scope of the microgravity research
projects that might be carried out. An-
other potential limitation (depending
upon the research requirements) on the
acceleration environment is produced by
the fact that the station in this option
must periodically roll in 90 degree incre-
ments in order to acquire the best orien-
tation for power generation. The time
intervals between roll maneuvers will
vary between 7 and 59 days. During the
intervals when a shuttle is not attached
in the international human-tended phase,
some microgravity research might be car-
ried out in a robotic, untended mode.
OPTION B
Since Option B is a scaled-down version
of Space Station Freedom, a number of
the research capabilities are more exten-
sive than those available in Option A, as
would be expected. For example, the
power available at the international hu-
man-tended phase is the same as the
power available at the permanent phase,
about 40 kW.
In the international human-tended phase,
the center of gravity of the system is in
the laboratory of the attached orbiter. At
permanent human capability, there are
more low-g racks than in Option A.
OPTION C
This option has the greatest total pres-
surized volume of all options. Although
the acceleration environment for most
microgravity experiments appears to be
satisfactory in the arrow flight mode, the
solar inertial attitude flight will have a
significant detrimental effect on fluid ex-
periments, including melted materials
that are being crystallized, and on some
combustion experiments. The solar iner-
tial mode will induce a rotating accelera-
tion vector in such fluid materials. There
may be a method of compensation for this
problem. This has not yet been examined
in detail for a station.
Passive attached engineering payloads
such as materials exposures and orbital
debris measurements cannot be flown in
a solar inertial attitude. Such research
can be carried out in the arrow flight
mode provided an active attitude-sensing
system is used with the payload.
In summary, there are not sufficient
over-riding differences in the three
sets of capabilities for life sciences,
human adaptation, and
microgravity research to be a deter-
mining factor in the choice of a spe-
cific redesign option.
IMPACT OF NUMBER OF CREW
Reduction of crew to four from eight im-
plies that two near full-time researchers
will be available to conduct experiments
for 90-day increments beginning with hu-
man-tended capability. Pilot-crew may
also assist in some phases of research.
All previous examinations of crew compo-
sition for space station missions recom-
mended a minimum of four researchers.
The present proposals will place signifi-
cant limits on station research productiv-
ity in several high-priority areas. During
the human-tended and permanent human
presence phases, the research require-
ments will be constrained by the number
of crew and their disciplinary qualifica-
tions. A comprehensive crew health care
system, including carefully considered
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duty cycles and off-duty activities, must
be developed to assure optimal crew per-
formance during long-duration space sta-
tion activities.
The pilot qualifications for flight are well-
established by NASA. The research crew
members in a small crew must consist of
mission specialists who have appropriate
technical backgrounds and the opportu-
nities to maintain scientific and technical
proficiency. Specialized backgrounds may
be appropriate for crew members working
on the highest priority experiments,
whereas generalists may be more appro-
priate for complex interweaving of sched-
uled diverse disciplinary experiments.
Crew assignments should be balanced
carefully with the research objectives.
NASA should reexamine both its crew se-
lection criteria and its ongoing programs
for maintaining astronauts' scientific and
engineering technical proficiencies.
Comparison of Performance
For systems as complex and diverse as
the space station, no adequate measures
of merit are suitable to unambiguously
define an optimum system. Comparison
of the options requires both broad quali-
tative and detailed quantitative perspec-
tives. The qualitative comparison was
presented in the two previous subsec-
tions.
that impact utilization, such as data man-
agement system capability, attitude, util-
ity for proximity operations, etc.
Microgravity science is rated for power
and microgravity level. This includes not
only low frequency but also dynamic com-
ponents. The life science rating reflects
the ability to do rack level experiments on
biological processes, and assumes a small
centrifuge. Examining Figure 12, it is
evident that by the time permanent hu-
man capability is reached in the three op-
tions, the ability to do scientific research
is not a strong discriminator.
The criteria used to evaluate engineering
research capability include: the ability to
extend, enhance, and replace space sta-
tion systems in orbit; the provision for en-
gineering attached payloads; and the
instrumentation of the space station sys-
tem. The modular nature of the systems
in Options A and B, together with the
more capable data system and number of
external payload attachments, give them
an advantage over Option C.
The international accommodation is rated
against adherence to the Memoranda of
Understanding and Intergovernmental
Agreements. The ranking favors Options
A and B. For a more detailed discussion,
see the section titled International Part-
ners' Assessment.
The options are quantitatively differenti-
ated by how well they support the five
principal objectives of the space station.
This is summarized in Figure 12. The
principal program objectives are: re-
search, comprising microgravity and life
science; engineering; international coop-
eration; commercial opportunities; and
human exploration. The ranking of the
options was based on the quantitative pa-
rameters of Figure 13, plus other factors
Commercial utilization requires a policy
to encourage industry participation plus a
worthwhile capability to be used. The
policy must state the cost of use, access,
priority for on-board resources, and pro-
tection of proprietary data. Commercial
use policy should encourage nontradi-
tional uses. The Administration should
state a clear policy for commercial use of
the space station. The capability needed
by commercial users could not be distin-
guished from that needed by the
microgravity, life sciences, and engineer-
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ing users. The ranking that appears in
Figure 12 reflects an average of those
three categories.
Long duration exposure of humans to
space conditions will gather the data nec-
essary before a decision to explore the so-
lar system with humans can be made.
The ranking of this was quite simple. If
human presence in excess of a year is
possible, it received a full score. If not, it
received none. The preparation for hu-
man exploration is a clear discriminator
between human-tended and permanent
human phases. It does not distinguish
between the options.
As an assessment of whether the space
station represents a true advance in capa-
bility, the three options under consider-
ation were compared with the baseline
Space Station Freedom, Skylab, and the
Russian Mir Space Station (Figure 14).
The ratings are assigned on the same ba-
sis as those of Figure 12.
All of the options considered, if car-
ried to permanent human presence,
would provide substantially greater
capability than previous stations.
Schedule
None of the redesign options meets the
White House goal to complete develop-
ment by the end of October 1998. How-
ever Option A does reach its human-
tended configuration by this point in
time.
A comparison of nominal schedules for
the three options is shown in Figures 15
and 16. The first depicts the launch se-
quences for a 28.8 ° orbit inclination
angle, and the second depicts a launch to
51.6 °. Somewhat complicating direct
comparisons of the options are the differ-
ences in station buildup strategies. Op-
tions A and B have a human-tended
phase, during which time the
internationals are brought on-board, fol-
lowed by permanent human capability,
which includes the internationals. Option
C moves directly to permanent U.S. hu-
man capability, and then brings on the
internationals.
Comparisons can be made at four sched-
ule points. The first comparison occurs
when the stations attain human-tended
on-orbit research capability. This is
shown by the left line in Figures 15 and
16, and shows that Options A and B
reach this point before C is permanently
inhabitable at both inclinations. Thus
Options A and B provide an opportunity
for early human-tended science, and pos-
sible intermediate stopping points. Op-
tion C has no human-tended phase.
The second comparison occurs when full
capability is achieved, with permanent
human capability, internationals, and full
power. This is shown by the line on the
right side of Figures 15 and 16. This
comparison is not a discriminator be-
tween Options A and C at 28.8 °. At
51.6 °, Option A is completed about a year
before C.
The third comparison is permanent hu-
man capability, achieved earliest by Op-
tion C, but without the internationals.
The last comparison is the date the inter-
national modules are complete. This oc-
curs earliest in Option A, next in Option
C, and last in Option B.
The number of shuttle flights needed to
reach each comparison point is indicated
in Figures 15 and 16 for the two inclina-
tions being considered. Looking beyond
assembly completion, the research sta-
tion function will be supported by five to
six logistics flight per year, for the 10 to
15 year lifetime of the station.
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Orbit Crew
Days in
Year
Research
Crew
Hours/Year
30-Day
Max Port
Power (kW)
Pressurized
Volume
User Rack
User Racks
< 2 _g**
External
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1444 6724 1449
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39 39 16
39/14 36 10/16
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49 46
38/31 45/28
15 15
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IPHC PHC
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Abbreviations:
HTC = Human-Tended Capability
IHTC = InternationalHuman-Tended Capability
PHC = Permanent Human Capability
U.S. PHC = U,S. Permanent Human Presence Capability
IHPC = International Human Presence Capability
* Solar Inertial Local Vertical/
Local Horizontal
** Without/With the Orbiter
Attached
Figure 13. Quantitative Comparison of Options' Research Resources
Category
Microgravity
Life Science
Engineering
Research
International
Commercial
Human
Exploration
Skylab
2O
6O
4O
0
40
0
Mir
4O
6O
6O
4O
6O
100
Spacelab
4O
8O
6O
6O
6O
Freedom
100
100
100
8O
100
100
Option
A
(PHC)
100
100
8O
8O
100
100
Option
B
(PHC)
100
100
100
I00
100
100
Option
C
(PHC)
100
100
6O
6O
8O
I00
Figure 14. Comparison of Various Stations with Redesign Options
(In percentage of desired capability)
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Figure 17. Fundamental Capacity and Launch Phases
Versus Time at 28.8 ° Inclination
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Using the measures of user power and
equipment racks as approximate indica-
tions of station capability, Figure 17
shows these quantities versus time. The
following observations can be made from
this figure:
Options A and B provide the earli-
est user capability. They do so in
late 1998. Full capability is
achieved in early to late 2000 re-
spectively.
Option C provides significant ini-
tial capability in late 1999. The fi-
nal capability is obtained in late
2001.
Options A and C meet the rack and
power requirements at approxi-
mately the same time, in late 1999.
Option A and B have 18 and 9 month
head starts respectively on C. On the
other hand, only a fraction of this time
will be available for scientific human-
tended activity because of continuing on-
orbit assembly and checkout operations.
When Option C is launched in the fourth
quarter of 1999, it surpasses the require-
ments and the capabilities of Options A
and B. If the proposed micro-g environ-
ment controller is used on Option C, the
vehicle can remain oriented to the solar
inertial mode most of the time. This
would ensure adequate power with the ini-
tial launch. In turn this would accelerate
the final capability by several months to
the fourth quarter of 2000, since the third
power module would not be required.
In summary, Option A achieves human-
tended research and international pres-
ence earliest. Option C achieves
permanent human presence earliest,
and both reach ultimate capability at
about the same time, well before Option
B. On average, schedule is not a dis-
criminator between Options A and C.
Cost
OVERALL ASSESSMENT
The Subcommittee on Cost Assessment
was provided with cost data to the sub-
system level for all options, summary
data by program cost element, and sup-
porting rationale. Additionally, the re-
sults of the 3-month NASA independent
cost analysis of Space Station Freedom
were reviewed. Members of the Commit-
tee also visited the facilities of the three
Space Station Freedom prime contractors,
Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas, and
Rocketdyne, to participate in briefings,
candid dialogue, and to observe work in
process and end products. [A glossary de-
fining customary cost terminology used in
this section is provided as Appendix E.]
The Station Redesign Team cost assess-
ment group conducted the costing process
for the redesign effort. Each option was
led by an experienced lead cost estimator
with technical familiarity with the pro-
cesses, products, and unique characteris-
tics related to a specific option and its
relationship to the appropriate NASA in-
stitutional capabilities and the Space Sta-
tion Freedom Program.
Funding changes, redirection, and the ab-
sence of long-term commitment to Space
Station Freedom have clearly resulted in
discontinuity, causing increased costs and
schedule slips. In an assessment of the
definitized contract value history of one of
the major Space Station Freedom prime
contractors, new requirements and sched-
ule slips resulting from "stop and go"
funding were responsible for 80 percent of
the contract cost growth over 5 years.
National commitment and appro-
priation stability are critical compo-
nents for a successful space station
program.
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A mador issue facing the Administration
and NASA is that funding guidelines are
not consistent with requirements to de-
velop the three redesign options. The 5-
year level funding guidelines fail to
recognize the inherent staffing profiles
associated with development programs.
None of the three station redesign op-
tions meet, in its fully implemented
phase, the cost targets of $5 billion,
$7 billion, and $9 billion for their
Fiscal Year 1994 through Fiscal
Year 1998 cumulative costs, includ-
ing program and all other cost im-
pacts. Nor does any option meet the
annual funding target while simul-
taneously achieving the schedule
milestones desired.
Unrealistic funding will repeat the Space
Station Freedom experience, where expec-
tations were oversold, which inexorably
and successively led to concerns about its
progress, causing periodic program re-
views, funding/baseline changes, and con-
comitant inefficiencies and finally to the
current redesign effort. Therefore, no
matter which option is selected, a na-
tional commitment must be made---pro-
viding funding stability.
NASA must relentlessly pursue cost-effec-
tive goals, such as a significant reduction
in management, elimination of the sepa-
rate Level II operation, the merging of fa-
cility functions, and other stated
objectives. Doing so will challenge NASA,
but is critical to the program's success.
Not doing so will certainly lead to contin-
ued cost and schedule overruns.
Although none of the options meets the
targeted funding goals (Figure 18), a com-
prehensive analysis of the costs required
to develop any meaningful capability to
conduct long-term, on-orbit research indi-
cates that this is a complex, technically
challenging, and costly endeavor.
The redesign effort has identified vi-
able options, with credible cost pro-
jections, which would permit the
development of a very capable sta-
tion while saving from 6 to 10 billion
dollars over the anticipated cost of
Space Station Freedom.
Our analysis took into account the results
of NASA's Independent Cost Assessment
Team's review of the Space Station Free-
dom Program, who found the baseline
program's cost and schedule risk to be
substantially understated. The indepen-
dent team believed that the Freedom pro-
Station
Design
FrY 94-98 * Balance to
Completion
Date of
Permanent
Human
Capability
Annual
Operations
Freedom 14.4 5.6 Sept 2000 2.4
(Baseline)
Option A 12.8 3.7 Oct 2000 1.4
13.3 6.0 Dec 2001Option B 1.5
Option C 11.9 3.3 Jan 2001 1.0
* Administration FY 94-98 Cost Targets are $5 billion, $7 billion, and $9 billion
Figure 18. Cost Comparison of Permanent Human Capability
(Real Year Dollars in Billions)
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gram required an additional $2.1billion
in funding through FiscalYear 2000,ex-
clusiveof the resourcesneededto develop
an interim assuredcrewreturn vehicle.
The program'sscheduleindicated an
identifiable 6-month slip to the flight
dates, with the risk of additional slips.
The assessment suggested that the poten-
tial additional slip represented further
funding risks, beyond the $2.1 billion
shortfall already identified.
A review of the team's findings led to the
conclusion that the likelihood of a sched-
ule slip beyond the determined 6 months
was high. The additional cost of that
schedule slippage is difficult to estimate,
due to the probability that an early recog-
nition of the slip potential would lead to
taking steps to mitigate the cost growth.
Costs developed for the redesigned sta-
tion include not only development and op-
eration costs, but also the other directly
coupled costs such as crew emergency re-
turn provisions, payloads, science institu-
tional support, shuttle modifications and
support, unique facility construction, and
certain early flight research missions.
Redirection of the program involves con-
tractual changes for the Government's
convenience that require partial or whole
terminations of contractor activities and
resultant outlays for a variety of costs, in-
cluding employee severance pay, facility
lease terminations, and liquidation of out-
standing purchase orders for parts and
materials.
A key element of the cost estimate for
each option is the recognition that there
is a substantial, realizable savings poten-
tial from management, organizational,
and contract changes.
The following are cost factors common to
all options:
Requirement for compatibility
with the launch and in-orbit capa-
bilities of the space shuttle.
Requirements of researchers for
extremely low microgravity, long-
duration stays, rapid and easy ac-
cess, high power levels, and crew
time.
• Provision of capabilities and ser-
vices to the international partners.
Summary-level costs for the Space Sta-
tion Freedom baseline budget, the inde-
pendent cost assessment estimate to
complete its development, and the esti-
mates for the three options are shown for
the various development phases in Figure
19. Figure 20 contains funding require-
ments by year for Fiscal Years 1994
through 1998 and the balance to comple-
tion. These are further discussed in the
subsequent option sections. It is notewor-
thy that only at the power station con-
figuration do the costs fall within the $5
billion, $7 billion, and $9 billion thresh-
old. Human-tended capability exceeds
the threshold goal by 16 to 30 percent.
The distributed costs for major systems
and functional elements of Space Station
Freedom and the three options are dis-
played in Figure 21.
NASA provided data that indicated cost
increases for crew return vehicles and
shuttle integration bring total costs for
the 51.6 ° inclination to:
Option A -- $17. 0 billion
Option B -- $19.7 billion
Option C -- $15.5 billion
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Capability
International
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Capability
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Human
Capability
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Capability
Date $ Date
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Figure 19. Space Station Cumulative Cost and Schedule Comparison
(Real-Year Dollars in Billions)
Inclination
28.8 o
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Balance to
Completion
Freedom* 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.0 3.0 5.6
Option A 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.4 3.8
Option B 2.3 2.6 2.9 2.8 2.7 6.0
Option C 1.8 1.9 2.8 3.0 2.4 3.3
* Baseline
Figure 20. Space Station Annual Funding Requirements
Permanent Human Capability
(Real-Year Dollars in Billions)
42
Inclination:
28.8
Function
Space
Station
Freedom
Baseline
Through
Sept 2000
Total Cost 22.1"
Development 7.4
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Figure 21. Space Station Cost Comparison
Permanent Human Capability (Real-Year Dollars in Billions)
OP'rmN SPF.CIF_C ASSESSMENT
Option A
The total cost of Option A-1 and Option
A-2 falls within the target costs only at
the power station development phase and
exceeds the goal at subsequent develop-
ment phases. Although only the power
station for Option A meets the funding
profile of $1.9 billion/year, the Station Re-
design Team has done a credible job esti-
mating these options, and the funding
profiles are realistic. The Allowance for
Program Adjustment reserves are realis-
tic for an effort of this complexity. The
Redesign Team's risk assessment is based
on detailed analysis at a subsystem ele-
ment level. The Committee's review of
this data provides confidence in the cred-
ibility of the cost estimate.
The cost estimates are calculated on the
premise that the necessary contract ter-
mination and/or descopes will be effective
July 1, 1993, although this is an aggres-
sive assumption. A timely decision and
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the ability of the transition team to react
quickly can offer substantial savings both
in terms of cost avoidance and the initia-
tion of the redirected efforts.
It is desirable to go to a single contractor
for integration responsibilities, and a
strong Program Manager should have the
flexibility to either direct the other con-
tractors to a subcontractor relationship or
a formal associate contractor relationship.
With this implementation, the separate
Level II operation now employed by Space
Station Freedom is eliminated, though
some of these functions and associated
costs will be required for the new desig-
nated Prime/Integrator.
An additional element of cost is the cadre
of civil service personnel currently sup-
porting the Space Station Freedom Pro-
gram. It is considered appropriate to
transition some of the current contractor
tasks, i.e., engineering analysis, safety/re-
liability, and mission control to civil ser-
vants. The Program Manager should be
given flexibility to make the trade-offs be-
tween civil service and contractor person-
nel during the transition phase. The
Committee also concurs with the Rede-
sign Team's model staffing matrix, which
shows a 24 percent total reduction in per-
sonnel: 18 percent contractor and 32 per-
cent civil service, including the
elimination of the separate Level II op-
eration support. Further reductions may
be achievable, but this option already
contains management reductions imple-
mented in early 1993.
The validity of the cost estimates is de-
pendent upon the appointment of an ef-
fective and empowered transition team
with a strong program manager as soon
as a decision is made on the option.
Option B
None of the development phases of Op-
tion B meets the Administration's cost
goals, but the estimate for this design ap-
pears accurate. The funding profile is re-
alistic even though it does not meet the
$1.9 billion/year goal. The reserve and al-
lowance for program adjustments are re-
alistic for an effort of this complexity even
though they have completed several Criti-
cal Design Reviews.
The cost estimates are calculated on the
assumption that the necessary contract
termination and/or descopes will be effec-
tive July 1, 1993. This is possible since
this does not depart drastically from the
current baseline. A timely decision and
the ability of the transition team to react
quickly can effect substantial savings
both in cost avoidance and the initiation
of baseline changes.
The costs assume that Option B will also
be integrated under a single contractor.
The Program Manager should have the
flexibility to either direct the other con-
tractors to subcontractor relationships or
to formal associate contractor relation-
ships. The separate Level II operation is
eliminated for this implementation; how-
ever, as in Option A, some of these costs
will still be incurred by the Prime/Inte-
grator.
The cadre of civil servants is a program
cost not included in these estimates.
However, the utilization of civil service
personnel for performing some of the sup-
port contractor tasks such as safety/reli-
ability issues, engineering analysis, and
console operation in the mission control
center is considered appropriate. As in
Option A, the Station Program Manager
should be given flexibility to make trade-
offs between civil service and contractor
personnel during the transition phase.
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The costestimate for Option B assumes
the RedesignTeam'smodelstaffing ma-
trix showing a 25percent total reduction
in personnel: 18percentin contractor
personneland 32percent in civil service,
including the elimination of the separate
Level II operation support. Further re-
ductionsmay be achievable;however,it
shouldbe noted that this Option alsocon-
tains managementreductions imple-
mentedin early Fiscal Year 1993.
The validity of all thesecostestimatesis
dependentupon the appointment of a
strong transition team to go to work as
soonas a decisionis madeon the option.
Option C
The cost estimating approach for this op-
tion reflects the hybrid character of the
design and development approach for new
structures and mechanisms, and unit cost
data for shuttle, Space Station Freedom,
and Spacelab hardware components. An
assumption made in costing Option C is
that the station is embedded within the
overall shuttle management environment,
thus saving a layer of management.
Option C does not meet the development
cost goals at any phase of development,
nor does it meet the annual phasing tar-
gets. It is questionable whether the re-
serves and Allowance for Program
Adjustment are adequate for the schedule
proposed. The maturity level of this de-
sign is significantly lower than Options A
and B even though portions of it are well
understood. The cost of modifying the
shuttle facility interface with almost half
the systems on Option C that are not or-
biter derived may be greater than esti-
mated. The cost of the recertification and
other processes requiring the use of
Columbia's aft structure and engine are
still unclear.
Once again, the cost estimates are calcu-
lated on the assumption that the neces-
sary contract terminations will be
effective July 1, 1993. It is unlikely that
both the White House and the Congres-
sional appropriations committees will
take the action necessary for this option
in a timely manner, as it requires the ter-
mination or subordination of the existing
contractors and the establishment of a
new sole source contractual arrangement.
Option C is a new development even
though it may have considerable inherit-
ance from the shuttle and Freedom pro-
grams. In the absence of Congressionally
approved reprogramming, there may be
no authority to use available funds in Fis-
cal Year 1993 to initiate the desirable
preparatory actions if Freedom is termi-
nated. Authority to proceed in Fiscal
Year 1994 requires completed legislative
actions and the President's signature on
new appropriation. The ability of these
offices to react quickly can effect substan-
tial savings both in terms of cost avoid-
ance and the ability to initiate the
redirected efforts.
Completed action by October 1, 1993, is
not a high probability. Also, in the event
of a Continuing Resolution, "new starts"
are not eligible for funding unless there is
specific authority in the resolution lan-
guage. Therefore, the dates for Option C
are at high risk in planning and schedul-
ing action.
Final Report
to the
President
Advisory
Committee
on the
Redesign
of the
Space Station
45
Final Report
to the
President
Advisory
Committee
on the
Redesign
of the
Space Station
• .oo.o ......
Risk Assessment
OPTION A
The risk factors associated with Option A
include EVA for assembly and mainte-
nance, the number of shuttle flights re-
quired to assemble the station, flight
schedule uncertainties, design maturity,
ground integration and verification, and
on-orbit assembly and checkout. Option
A depends completely on the space
shuttle for launch of components and re-
quires no new launch vehicle. Overall,
Option A must be considered a high risk,
as discussed below.
A very significant number of EVA hours
(currently 224 hours) would be needed to
assemble the Option A station. While
somewhat less than the requirement for
the baseline station, the EVA workload
and associated risk to successful comple-
tion and to flight crew safety are substan-
tial. In addition, several thousand
station maintenance components would
be located outside the pressurized volume
and would require EVA for routine main-
tenance or replacement. Although EVA
has been shown to be a versatile use of
humans during spaceflight, the workload
is high, and experience indicates that no
ground-based training facility provides
the fidelity needed for some complex and
sensitive operations. Total dependence
upon the integrity of the spacesuit makes
the crew member susceptible to microme-
teoroids, space debris impacts, or critical
system failures.
This option would require 16 space
shuttle flights to complete assembly. De-
pendence upon a tightly coordinated and
successful shuttle launch schedule is an
inherent risk, since each flight would
carry critical, often one-of-a-kind, hard-
ware. Flight delays could delay assembly,
increase cost, or under some circum-
stances, threaten the entire program. A
shuttle accident might result in a major
flight interruption and loss of critical
components.
For high inclination orbits, the flight
schedule requires development of the alu-
minum-lithium external tank, potentially
the advanced solid rocket motor, and on-
time availability of station hardware. If
required, on-time availability of the ad-
vanced solid rocket motor is a major risk
item. Launch of the "common module,"
which is heavier than early components
of Option B, would require more boost ca-
pability or placement at a lower altitude.
The flight schedule risk increases with
time due to the number of shuttle flights
carrying critical components.
The design maturity of Option A compo-
nents is relatively high. Many compo-
nents are derivatives of or identical to
those planned for the baseline station,
with a number of desirable simplifica-
tions. An option to use the well-proven
Bus-1 for attitude control and propulsion
may be selected. The integration of these
components has not been evaluated in a
Critical Design Review process. In addi-
tion, a number of fundamental questions
about orbital debris protection, spare part
availability, and likelihood of critical com-
ponent failure during assembly raise
doubts about the viability of the design.
A number of critical uncertainties associ-
ated with avionics integration, software
verification, and systems management
also remain. Prior to launch, it would
not be possible to conduct a fully inte-
grated test of all flight hardware. Some
components would already be in space by
the time others are built and available for
testing.
On-orbit assembly and checkout would be
highly complex, requiring delivery of com-
ponents on the space shuttle, and a large
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EVA workload. The crew and the flight
control team would needto dealwith the
unexpected,systemsfailures, trouble-
shooting,and needfor spare parts. To a
lesserdegree,this is the sameasthe of-
ten cited risk of assemblingthe baseline
station concept. However,the baseline
station has a mobile transporter that en-
hancesrobotic operationsin the assembly
process.Lack of this capability will place
addedstress and complexity onEVA as-
semblyoperations and significantly in-
creasesrisk.
Option A is a high risk option dur-
ing the critical launch and assembly
operations.
OPTION B
The risk factors associated with Option B
include EVA for assembly and mainte-
nance, the number of shuttle flights re-
quired to assemble the station, flight
schedule uncertainties, design maturity,
ground integration and verification, and
on-orbit assembly and checkout. Option
B depends completely on the space
shuttle and does not require development
of a new launcher. Option B is consid-
ered the highest risk.
Option B would require the highest level
of EVA (311 hours) for the on-orbit as-
sembly operations. EVA is an inherent
risk to flight crew safety, and such heavy
dependence on EVA threatens the success
of station assembly. In addition, several
thousand components outside the pres-
surized volume would require EVA for
routine maintenance or replacement, and
analysis indicates that the planned 187
hours per year of additional EVA for
maintenance may be inadequate. Crew
members have demonstrated that they
can perform significant tasks during
EVA. However, ground-based training fa-
cilities can not always provide full fidelity
to ensure successful operations.
Option B would require the largest num-
ber of space shuttle flights to complete as-
sembly (20 flights for permanent human
capability). It, therefore, has the highest
risk associated with dependence on a
timely shuttle launch schedule. Flight de-
lays, of the type often experienced in the
shuttle program, would delay assembly
and increase cost. A shuttle accident
might result in a major flight interrup-
tion and loss of critical components, since
each flight would carry critical, often one-
of-a-kind, hardware.
The risk to the schedule for the first
flight to a 51.6 ° orbit is approximately the
same as outlined for Option A, requiring
early development of the aluminum-
lithium external tank and on-time avail-
ability of station hardware. The flight
schedule risk to achieve a complete sta-
tion would be higher than for Option A
due to the increased number of shuttle
flights carrying critical components.
The design maturity of Option B compo-
nents is higher than that of the other op-
tions. Its components are identical to
those planned for the baseline station.
This design option maintains what ap-
pears to be unnecessary complexity which
further increases development risk. The
Critical Design Review leaves a number
of critical problems. Negative electrical
power margins, inadequate orbital debris
shielding, lack of EVA margins, incom-
plete design drawings, module weight
growth, unavailability of spares, and criti-
cal component failure probabilities during
assembly threaten the viability of the
baseline design.
This option would have the highest risk
associated with systems validation. A
number of uncertainties are associated
with the data management system, flight
software verification, and avionics inte-
gration. The systems are highly complex
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and cannot be fully tested and integrated
on the ground, since some components
will already be in space by the time oth-
ers are built and available for testing.
In summary, Option B would have the
most complex on-orbit assembly and
checkout, but unlike Option A, is sup-
ported by a fully capable robotic system.
It would have the largest number of com-
ponents delivered in space for assembly,
subject to failures requiring spare parts
and the greatest dependence on a sus-
tained space shuttle flight rate. It would
also have the highest EVA requirement
for assembly operations. These have been
the most often cited risk areas for the
baseline station; therefore, this option has
the highest risk in this area.
High shuttle launch rate, narrow
performance margins, EVA, and as-
sembly complexity make Option B
the highest risk option.
OPTION C
The risk factors associated with Option C
include development of a shuttle-derived
launch vehicle, the number of subsequent
shuttle flights required to outfit the sta-
tion, flight schedule uncertainties, and
design maturity. It requires the least
number of assembly flights, the lowest
level of EVA, can be fully constructed and
checked out on the ground, and has sim-
plified on-orbit checkout. Option C is the
lowest risk option.
The shuttle-derived launch vehicle re-
quired by Option C is a new development
based on several years of studies related
to the "Shuttle-C" concept. It uses basic
shuttle components and has been sub-
jected to analysis and wind tunnel tests.
To the degree that it is a "new" launcher,
it still carries significant cost, schedule,
and performance risks.
Option C would require a number of
space shuttle flights to transport experi-
ment racks, expendables, the interna-
tional modules, and to support delivery of
the assured crew return vehicle. How-
ever, the station is permanently manned
and operational after three to five space
shuttle flights. It has the lowest risk as-
sociated with dependence on a timely
shuttle launch schedule.
The schedule to achieve first flight has a
higher risk than the other options be-
cause the launcher and the station hard-
ware designs are relatively new, though
based on well-known flight hardware.
However, the flight schedule risk to
achieve a complete station would be lower
than for the other options due to simplic-
ity, minimum components, and lowest
need for shuttle flights.
The design maturity of Option C compo-
nents is low, but the station is very simi-
lar to Skylab, using baseline power
arrays, space shuttle avionics, and a
number of other baseline station systems.
The launcher is based on space shuttle
components. Overall, the current design
maturity risk is greater than that of the
other options, but the "schedule to go"
risk should be the lowest after a solid
Critical Design Review.
Option C would have the lowest risk asso-
ciated with systems validation since it
would use shuttle avionics and software,
and it can be completely constructed (ex-
cept for a number of experiment racks
and the international elements) and
checked out on the ground.
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Option C would havethe lowestlevel of
on-orbit assemblyand checkout,sinceit
would have the least number of major
componentsdeliveredin space. (It re-
quires only 12hours of EVA to attain in-
ternational capability.) This minimizes
oneof the most often cited risk areasfor
the baselinestation.
Risk to human life is considerablylower
for Option C becauseit has:
• Lessthan one-half the manned
launches
Lessthan one-tenththe EVA as-
semblyhours
One-half to one-third the EVA
maintenancehours, and
Better micrometeoroidshielding.
In summary, Option C is the lowest
risk option to achieve full space sta-
tion capability.
Overall Comparison
of the Options
The Committee's assessment of the rede-
sign options is summarized below:
Option A and B Comparison. While
Option A-2 has more capability at lower
cost, Option A-1 may be more attractive
in terms of risk reduction. The options
are similar enough that the Committee
will not distinguish between them.
Option A is a desirable simplification of
both Space Station Freedom and Option
B. Option A is considered by the Com-
mittee to be the preferred modular
buildup approach, and it is compared be-
low with Option C.
Phase of Development Comparison.
Considering the expense of developing a
power station ($6 billion) and its limited
capability to extend on orbit stay of a
modified shuttle beyond 25 days, the
power station as a stopping point is not
acceptable.
Human-tended capability represents a
substantial fraction of the development
cost of permanent human capability, but
less than 50 percent of its ultimate capa-
bility. Thus, the cost/benefit of Options A
and B is least attractive at human-tended
capability and most attractive at perma-
nent human capability.
In Option C, there is little extra cost in
bringing on the international modules
and experiments, and the addition of a
power module at the permanent human
presence phase will cost several hundred
million dollars. In view of the small in-
cremental costs, stopping Option C before
permanent human presence is not recom-
mended.
Option C and A Comparison. In terms
of overall technical and international ca-
pability, Option A is somewhat superior
to Option C.
Considering development risk, launch
risk, on-orbit assembly and EVA, Option
C has an advantage in technical risk over
Option A.
Option A has an advantage over Option C
in achieving an early human-tended capa-
bility, but more overall schedule risk
through completion.
Overall Conclusion. There are two at-
tractive options that should be seriously
considered by the Administration, Op-
tions A and C. Option A has an advan-
tage in capability and lends itself to
modular buildup. Option C is the lowest
risk and potentially lower in cost.
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GENERAL MISSION
RISK FACTORS
lthough not specifically related tothe individual options under con-
sideration, various risk factors
are important to consider in future devel-
opments regardless of the design option
chosen. Such risks could delay planned
deployment, greatly increase cost, lead to
loss of critical station components, result
in loss of crew, or substantially degrade
mission performance. Risks include un-
availability of the selected launch vehicle,
accidental loss of a launch pad or other
ground facilities, loss of communications
with the flight control center, extrave-
hicular activity accidents, orbital debris
or micrometeoroid impacts, toxic or bio-
logical contamination, in-flight fires, loss
of critical systems, radiation hazards, and
damage incurred during ground process-
ing.
Accidents and technical problems can
"ground" a fleet of launch vehicles. Fig-
ure 22 summarizes launch vehicle down
times in the past several years. The U.S.
shuttle program was dormant from Janu-
ary 1986 until September 1988. During
portions of this period, the USAF Titan
program and the European Ariane pro-
gram were also "grounded" due to acci-
dents, resulting in the complete loss of
heavy lift capability outside the USSR.
Hydrogen leaks also "grounded" the
shuttle for 6 months in 1990. The Atlas
Centaur has experienced delays of 9
months and 30 months (the total down
time includes other than accident-related
delays) due to failures. While not related
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Figure 22. Launch Vehicle Downtimes, 1986-1992
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to launcher availability, the SovietSoyuz
program was "grounded"from June 1970
until September1973following a fatal re-
entry accident. On the other hand, a non-
fatal Soyuzupper stagefailure in April
1975was followedby a successfullaunch
the following month, and a non-fatal
Soyuzexplosionon the launch pad in Sep-
tember 1983was followed by a successful
launch in February 1984. The potential
for a launch accidentand lossof critical
station componentsincreasesdirectly
with the number of flights required to de-
ploy the station.
Launch pad damageor destruction is also
an inherent, but somewhatless likely,
risk. In March 1986,a Titan 34C failure
at VandenburgAFB resulted in major
launchpad damageand lesserdamageto
an adjacentlaunch pad. In 1983,
Vladimir Titov and GennadiyStrekalov
survived an explosionof their SoyuzT-10
boosterthat resulted in major damageto
the launch pad. Multiple launch padsfor
all major launch vehiclesprovidea degree
of redundancy,but at reducedflight
rates. In addition, there are a number of
single point failures, including launch
processingfacilities, payloadprocessing
facilities, and rangecommandand control
centers. Lossof any of thesewould pre-
cludefuture launch activities. The poten-
tial for lossof launch capability due to
any of thesereasons,including launcher
availability, arguesfor the dual accessi-
bility affordedby higher inclination orbits
achievable with Russian launch vehicles
and those of other nations.
Loss of communications can result from
the loss of the TDRSS satellite link, loss
of ground stations, loss of on-board sys-
tems, or configuration obstructions. On
the latest shuttle flight, communication
was lost for about 90 minutes due to an
error by flight controllers. A similar error
resulted in the loss Of a Soviet Phobos
satellite several years ago. The electro-
magnetic environment can also disrupt
communications, and there is some con-
cern about this impact at latitudes associ-
ated with higher inclination orbits.
Although ground and on-board system re-
dundancy is impressive, a backup to the
TDRSS link seems prudent. This is mag-
nified by the inability of TDRSS to simul-
taneously support data transmissions
from the station and a rendezvousing
space shuttle orbiter vehicle. The exist-
ing UHF backup is very limited in cover-
age and capability.
The potential for an EVA accident is in-
herently high due to absolute dependence
on the protection and environment pro-
vided by the space suit. On the other
hand, there have been no accidents in ei-
ther the U.S. or Russian programs. Most
hazards can be prevented with high-fidel-
ity training, but systems failures and mi-
crometeoroids or space debris can be life
threatening. The ability of crew members
to perform intricate and demanding EVA
tasks is well documented in the U.S. and
Russian experience. To minimize risk
and its potential impact on station de-
ployment, however, dependence upon
EVA should be strictly controlled in the
design process.
Orbital debris impacts can be extraordi-
narily hazardous. Objects more than 20
centimeters in size can be tracked by cur-
rent radars and avoided with station ma-
neuvers. We are limited, however, in our
actual capability to track lethal objects
and provide timely notice for station ma-
neuvers. Shielding can prevent damage
by objects smaller than 1 centimeter. In
addition, there remains a high risk due to
our inability to track small but lethal ob-
jects in the 1 to 10 centimeter size range
and our lack of adequate test facilities to
simulate their effects. We know that
space debris is increasing. Accurate mod-
els are still not available to accurately
predict the changing environment within
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an order of magnitude. Shuttle orbiter
windows are replaced due to small cumu-
lative impact pits, and a large single pit
was observed on STS-7. Orbiter tiles are
also replaced after debris impact damage.
Several orbiter flights have taken evasive
maneuvers to ensure adequate separa-
tion. The debris population is higher, but
the velocity alignment is more favorable
for shielding at higher inclinations. The
Russian Mir station at an inclination of
51.6 ° has taken several debris impacts
that startled the crew, and fist-sized
holes have been made in the solar arrays.
Toxic or biological contamination of the
station may result from experiments or
visiting crew members. There have been
several cases of on-orbit leakage of mate-
rial from experiments. A facility to hold
monkeys failed to contain feces and other
materials on one of the Spacelab flights.
Biological samples have been flown on
both Russian and American spacecraft.
Air and water samples have been re-
turned for ground testing on numerous
space flights. Russians on the Mir sta-
tion have had a long-lasting battle with
fungi that grow in the enclosed environ-
ment. Adequate containment, detection,
and cleanup capabilities should be consid-
ered in the design process.
A fire in the closed environment of a
spacecraft is a life-threatening hazard,
and much has been done to reduce the
likelihood of combustion. Prevention, de-
tection, and suppression are design fea-
tures. Electrical fires are the most likely
type of spacecraft fire, and they can lead
to emission of toxic fumes. Several in-
stances of smoking or arcing have been
reported on the space shuttle orbiter, but
have been readily controlled by turning
off malfunctioning equipment. There
have been at least two fires on Russian
space stations. One of these created a
great deal of smoke, but was controlled by
identifying the source and turning the
equipment off. In the other case, the
source was under the cabin floor, and a
fire extinguisher was used before turning
the power off. The crew used oxygen
masks for an extended period in this case
due to smoke and extinguisher products
in the cabin.
Radiation is a hazard that increases with
orbital inclination and altitude. Single
event effects influence electronic equip-
ment and require radiation hardened
components. Crew radiation dosages are
elevated during the portion of orbits over
higher latitudes, but at 51.6 °, only very
short periods are spent in regions of el-
evated dosage. Environmental monitor-
ing and imposed dose limits will be
important factors in design and opera-
tions. Russian cosmonauts who were on
the Mir station during the intense solar
storms of 1989 experienced high radiation
fluxes for several minutes on each orbit,
but the total dosage was less than pre-
flight limits based on no solar storm ac-
tivity. However, cosmonauts privately
complained that their medical staff was
unconcerned about radiation dosage.
Loss of critical systems on the space sta-
tion is largely controlled by redundant
components and on-orbit replacement of
failed units. Designers need to be con-
cerned about accessibility of hardware as-
sociated with the guidance, navigation,
and control system, life support system,
data management system, remote ma-
nipulator system, and other critical sys-
tems and components. Failures are not
uncommon, but redundancy has pre-
vented loss of capability in all cases. The
ability of the crew to make repairs has
been shown to be a vital ingredient in
spacecraft systems integrity.
Loss or failure of critical experimental fa-
cilities, including the furnaces, airlock,
and centrifuge, can preclude numerous
scientific operations. This equipment
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must beprotectedfrom single point fail-
ures, funding and scheduleuncertainties,
and other risks.
During groundprocessing,there are risks
of damagingcritical flight hardware dur-
ing test, assembly,and transportation.
The shuttle orbiter and severalpayloads
have beendamagedduring processing.
Risk will probably beelevatedif unfamil-
iar workers or non-standardground test
or handling equipment are used. These
risks may besubstantially higher if more
than onelaunch site is used to overcome
other risk factors.
Thesemission risks factors are important
designconsiderations. Somerepresent
discriminators betweenthe options. We
must remain mindful of all of them, and
their consequences,if we proceedwith de-
sign, deployment,and operationof a
spacestation.
Space [light is inherently risky. The
Nation must maintain the proper
mechanisms to evaluate, control, mini-
mize, and monitor such risks.
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INTERNATIONAL
PARTNERS' ASSESSMENT
he following section provides aprogrammatic assessment, on the
part of the International Partner
members of the panel, of the initiation,
conduct and technical outcome of the
space station redesign.
This, the latest in a series of Space Sta-
tion Freedom redesigns by the United
States and, above all, the consequential
decisions that will be taken by the US
government, will have an impact on the
respective programs of the International
Partners. The US Partner has explicitly
committed itself in the Intergovernmental
Agreement (IGA) and Memoranda of Un-
derstanding (MOU's) to providing the
"Core Space Station" which is essential to
the other Partners' contributions, while
Canada, Europe and Japan have commit-
ted themselves to providing significant el-
ements which together with the US core
Station will create an international space
station complex with greater capabilities.
The Partners entered into the cooperation
in the expectation that this unique part-
nership would pioneer international coop-
eration in research and technology
development. They considered that it rep-
resented a critical step in the human ex-
ploration and utilisation of space. The
Partners were so convinced of the merits
of this arrangement that they signifi-
cantly restructured their own space pro-
grams to make the Space Station one of
their cornerstone programs.
We, the International Partners, are all
significantly advanced in the development
of our respective contributions and collec-
tively have already invested in excess of
$3 billion. The current redesign had an
immediate impact on our programs, in-
cluding serious perturbations to plans to
release critical industrial contracts. This
disruption to our programs will become
increasingly problematic until the situa-
tion is resolved to the satisfaction of all
parties involved.
The Intergovernmental Agreement is the
existing legal instrument between the
governments of the US, Japan, Canada
and nine member states of the European
Space Agency, which is considered to
have the status of an international treaty.
Memoranda of Understanding serve to
implement the provisions of the IGA be-
tween NASA and its counterpart imple-
menting agencies (CSA, ESA and STA/
NASDA). Inherent in the IGA and accom-
panying MOU's are specific commitments
negotiated over a number of years by all
of the partners, as to the missions and
utilisation of the International Space Sta-
tion, the overall management of the pro-
gram, the essential technical contribution
to be made by each partner, the sharing
of space station resources, the operation
and utilisation of the facility once as-
sembled and the sharing of common op-
erations costs.
In 1991, the Italian Space Agency entered
into a separate MOU with NASA, ratified
at government level in early 1993, to pro-
vide two mini pressurised logistics mod-
ules and a mini-lab for the International
Space Station. This contribution, made in
the framework of the US partner contri-
bution, was in addition to the Italian in-
volvement in the ESA contribution.
The US invited its partners to participate
in the redesign effort. With the establish-
ment of the Operating Ground Rules
agreed to on March 26th, 1993 by the
IGA partners and on April 21st by ASI,
the International Partners became active
participants in the Space Station Rede-
sign Team (SRT).
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Programmatic Assessment
The common position of the International
Partners can be summarised as follows:
Given the present constraints as
regards budgetary guidelines and
limitations on study options, we
have serious concerns about the
ability to meet the commitments
in the IGA and MOU's for Space
Station. Within these constraints
the accommodation of our contri-
butions is not achievable.
All options must be implementable
within the long term international
cooperative framework established
among the partners on the basis of
genuine partnership and the
provision by the International
Partners of their own elements as
their contribution to the building,
in low earth orbit, of a perma-
nently manned civilian space
station.
Transition to a new management
regime, must provide for continu-
ity with current program manage-
ment to maximize the benefits of
investments to date.
It is essential that all options be
assessed against broad and well-
defined development and opera-
tions requirements including a
utilisation scenario and that any
changes to the current Space
Station Freedom design be based
on mature assessments of all
parameters of importance, in
particular requirements, cost and
schedule.
No systematic traceability to the
current Space Station Freedom
requirements baseline has yet
been established, making it very
difficult to make comparisons
between the three redesign options
and the current Space Station
Freedom baseline in terms of
capabilities and performances.
The International Partners fully
support the proposals made for
reducing operations costs by
reduction of planning manpower
levels, simplification of training
approach and consolidation of
sustaining engineering effort. We
recognise that this should result in
benefits for all partners.
The International Partners believe
that further cost efficiencies could
be achieved by a more optimised
distribution of responsibilities, and
a greater use of the partners'
facilities as their contribution to
common station operations costs.
Offers of additional hardware and
services, for example, the Euro-
pean offer to study the provision of
the Data Relay Satellite (DRS),
Assured Crew Return Vehicle
(ACRV), Automated Transfer
Vehicle (ATV) and Ariane launch
services should be taken into
account.
Launching to a 51.6 degree incli-
nation orbit has significant techni-
cal, programmatic and operational
implications to the program, in
particular with respect to:
The need for enhanced shuttle
performance for station assembly
(ASRMs and A1-Li external tank),
or downsizing of pressurized
modules
The increased number of station
assembly and resupply flights with
associated cost impacts.
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The International Partners fully
support the objective to achieve
multiple access, which is under-
stood to be the main driver for this
orbit. However, this can also be
achieved at other inclinations by
use of European and Japanese
vehicles from their launch sites.
Selection of orbital inclination
should be based on optimisation of
all factors involved with specific
emphasis on minimisation of
operations costs.
It is recommended that NASA
works together with the Interna-
tional Partners to maximise the
benefits of a simplified DMS
architecture for all options, whilst
minimising the impacts to all
partners.
The proposed delivery schedules
for partner provided elements is
subject to further confirmation by
each partner, following option
selection and subsequent final
assessment by each partner of the
associated impacts on its respec-
tive programs.
Option Specific Assessments
OPTION A
The overall configuration ad-
equately accommodates the APM
and the JEM. There is some
reduction in continuous viewing
capability for the JEM and APM
Exposed Facilities. Crucial ele-
ments of the Mobile Servicing
System have been deleted, includ-
ing its Mobile Transporter, and
significant changes have been
made to its command and control
system. Without a Mobile Trans-
porter, the robotic arm must
"walk" on the station, thereby
significantly increasing the com-
plexity of robotic assembly and
maintenance activities. The
shuttle manipulator arm is also
being proposed for use in assembly
tasks that are beyond its current
design envelope.
The proposed simplification of
APM/JEM physical interfaces
represents a significant potential
improvement over the current
baseline, with in particular, a
reduction of EVA for APM/JEM
assembly and simplification of
interface verification.
The stretched version of the Mini-
Pressurised Logistics Module
(MPLM), foreseen by this option, is
considered feasible by ASI, and
can be accommodated within the
current ASI/NASA agreement.
However, the proposed increase in
the number of flight units, to-
gether with the provision of the
MPLM derived "closet" module
required by this option will have a
major programmatic impact.
OPTION B
For Option B which, like Option A,
is a modular concept, the overall
configuration is satisfactory. In all
major respects this option is very
close to the current Space Station
Freedom and benefits from the
maturity of this baseline.
OPTION C
The US core module already
provides more payload volume
than the current SSF baseline,
thus putting in question the real
need for the additional payload
volume provided by the Interna-
tional Partner modules. The
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addition of thesemodulesfurther
reducesthe availability of other
critical payloadresourcessuchas
powerand heat rejection.
The level of maturity of the Option
C designis consideredto be inad-
equate.
The amount of new development
associatedwith this option, includ-
ing NSTSmodifications, is consid-
ered to representa high cost and
schedulerisk to the programme.
The fire detection and suppression
system doesnot seemto meet the
safety requirements currently
imposedon the baseline.
The DMS and the Communica-
tions and Tracking systemwill
have a significant impact on the
partners' current contributions.
Important elementsof Canada's
Mobile Servicing Systemhave
beendeletedand their assembly
and maintenancerole is dimin-
ished. Provision for on-orbit
maintenanceof thesemanipula-
tors hasnot beenassured. New
launch accommodationsand a new
end-to-endcommandand control
systemfor the robotsare required.
The overall configuration and
operationalmodesof Option C
doesnot allow continuouszenith
or nadir viewing from the JEM
ExposedFacility, or from the APM
ExposedFacility and calls into
question the utility of this option
as an observationplatform.
By providing accommodationfor
the centrifugewithin the US
Module, Option C excludesthe
potential to accommodatethe ASI
mini-lab.
The identified needof a third
MPLM flight unit will have a
major programmatic impact for
ASI.
Conclusion
The International Partners consider it
mandatory that any international space
station program resulting from this rede-
sign exercise is one that can be imple-
mented in line with the procedures laid
down in the intergovernmental and
agency to agency agreements. It should
have the capacity to meet the objectives,
and support the mission of the current In-
ternational Space Station Freedom pro-
gram. It should be affordable for all the
partners, should be managed in a manner
that ensures cost effective development as
well as operation and utilisation, and it
should provide all partners with benefits
commensurate to their respective contri-
butions.
Regardless of the redesign option se-
lected, there is still much engineering
work to be completed during the subse-
quent transition period. Consistent and
detailed design and operations require-
ments have to be re-established and ap-
proved by NASA and the International
Partners, as appropriate. The station as-
sembly sequence up to, and including, as-
sembly and outfitting of the International
Partners' elements has to be analysed
and verified. Planning for timely Space
Station maintainability throughout its
lifetime must be assessed.
A revised operations baseline has to be
established with optimisation of all part-
ner roles and responsibilities with NASA
commitment to use partner capabilities,
such as Ariane, ATV, ACRV, DRS, JDRS
and H-II to offset common operations
costs.
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Launching the International Partners'
modules on expendable launchers would
require significant design modifications
and would increase the partners' costs ac-
cordingly. Should this alternative be pur-
sued, the partners' own launch
capabilities will be considered first.
The International Partners' contributions
to the common station operating costs
should be fixed within a financial ceiling
to be agreed.
Options A and B are both acceptable from
an International Partner module accom-
modation and utilisation point of view.
However, taking into account the doubts
associated with the robotics aspects of as-
sembly and maintenance of Option A, this
option is considered to have a higher risk
than Option B.
For Option C, the International Partners
have strong reservations due to its lack of
maturity. Furthermore, the loss of the
essential role of the International Part-
ners' modules renders this option unat-
tractive with respect to their current
contributions. The technical and pro-
grammatic uncertainties of Option C con-
stitute a higher risk than the other
options.
Any decision not to proceed, or to proceed
with a space station in a manner that
does not adequately accommodate the in-
terests of all the partners, would result in
a significant set-back for international
collaboration in science and technology.
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POTENTIAL COOPERATION
WITH THE RUSSIANS
uring the course of the redesigneffort, NASA invited the Russian
Space Agency and several Rus-
sian aerospace contractors to share their
experiences with long-duration space
flight and to assist in an assessment of
the capabilities of their various hardware
systems. Given the time constraints and
our concentration on assessing the work
of the Redesign Team and the interna-
tional partners, only a few areas of pos-
sible cooperation with Russians were
examined.
However, the Committee was able to
identify two important areas where Rus-
sian cooperation would be beneficial: em-
ploying the Soyuz spacecraft as an
assured crew return vehicle, and utilizing
Russian launch vehicles and sites. The
potential selection of a higher inclination
orbit could enhance the opportunity for
use of Russian space assets. For a discus-
sion of these subjects, see the "General
Mission Considerations" section.
The Committee also feels that the Rus-
sians have other important capabilities
that could be advantageous to a rede-
signed space station. Among such assets
are automated rendezvous and docking
hardware, environmental control and life
support systems, Mir, and other mechani-
cal components.
These assets could be utilized in many
different facets of the space station pro-
gram. For example, Russian automated
rendezvous and docking hardware would
potentially permit the use of a common
docking capability for both the Soyuz-
Progress vehicles and for NASA's shuttle.
With almost 20 years of experience, the
Russian environment control and life sup-
port systems would help minimize electri-
cal power requirements for the station.
Finally, Mir offers another potential for
early joint-nation cooperative research op-
portunities.
The Committee recommends that
NASA and the Administration fur-
ther pursue opportunities for coop-
eration with the Russians as a
means to enhance the capability of
the station, reduce cost, provide al-
ternative access to the station, and
increase research opportunities.
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ington State University Foundation. He
is also a former president and current
board member of the Association of Space
Explorers. In 1986 he served on the
President's Commission to Investigate the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident.
James A. Fain, Jr. In May 1993, Lieu-
tenant General James A. Fain, Jr. be-
came the Commander, Aeronautical
Systems Center, Air Force Material Com-
mand, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
Ohio. A command pilot and test pilot
with more than 4,500 flying hours, he
earned his wings in 1964 from Moody Air
Force Base, Georgia. He then completed
numerous B-52 flight assignments. In
1971 he entered the Air Force Test Pilot
School at Edwards Air Force Base, Cali-
fornia. Upon graduation in 1973, General
Fain was assigned to the 13th Tactical
Fighter Squadron,Udorn Royal Thai Air
Force Base, Thailand, as an F-4 pilot. He
returned to the U.S. in 1974 and served
in various aspects of flight testing at
Kirtland Air Force Base and back at
Edwards. In 1981, General Fain became
chief of Test and Integration for the
LANTRIN program (Low Altitude Navi-
gation and Targeting Infrared System for
Night) at Wright-Patterson, and later be-
came director of the Strike System Pro-
gram Office. In 1992, the general became
director of requirements, at Wright-
Patterson's Headquarters Air Force Mate-
rial Command. His military decorations
include the Legion of Merit, Meritorious
Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, Air
Medal with two oak leaf clusters, and Air
Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf
cluster. He earned a bachelor's degree in
engineering from the U.S. Air Force
Academy and a master's degree in sys-
tems management from the University of
Southern California.
Edward B. Fort. Since 1981, Dr. Fort
has served as the Chancellor of North
Carolina A & T State University in
Greensboro. Under his leadership, the
University's School of Engineering has
become the nation's number one producer
of black engineers at the Master's degree
level. In addition, he was a leader in the
negotiation of a joint venture with NASA
and North Carolina State University to
establish the MARS Space Research Cen-
ter. The University has also been desig-
nated as a NASA Center for Engineering
Excellence. During his education career
Dr. Fort has served as the Chancellor of
the University of Wisconsin System Cen-
ter, Superintendent of Schools in Sacra-
mento, California and in Inkster,
Michigan, Adjunct Professor of Adminis-
tration at the University of Michigan, and
Visiting Professor at the University of De-
troit. Dr. Fort received a Bachelor's,
Master's, and an Honorary Doctorate of
Law at Wayne State University. He
earned his Ph.D. from the University of
California-Berkeley. He is currently a
member of NASA's Advisory Council, the
President's Advisory Board on Histori-
cally Black Colleges and Universities, the
Biotechnology Board of North Carolina,
and the International Association of Uni-
versity Presidents. Dr. Fort is also Chair
of the Advisory Committee on Educa-
tional Opportunities and Achievement of
the American Association of State Univer-
sities and Colleges.
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Dr. Mary Lowe Good. Dr. Good has
been associated with Allied Signal Inc.
since 1985 and currently serves as the Se-
nior Vice President for Technology. From
1980 to 1985, she was Vice President-Di-
rector of Research at UOP, Inc. Dr. Good
came to private industry from the aca-
demic community where she was the
Boyd Professor of Materials Science at
Louisiana State University and the Boyd
Professor of Chemistry at the University
of New Orleans. She served as a member
of the President's Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology, as well as the
National Science Board including terms
as Vice Chairman and Chairman. She is a
member of the Council of the National
Academy of Engineering and serves on
the Joint High Level Oversight Advisory
Panel to the United States-Japan Agree-
ment on Cooperation in Research and De-
velopment in Science and Technology.
Dr. Good is also a member of NASA's
Space Systems and Technology Advisory
Committee and sits on the Board of Di-
rectors of Cincinnati Milacron Inc. and
Ameritech. Additionally, Dr. Good is on
the Board of Trustees of Rensselaer Poly-
technic Institute. The author of/nte-
grated Laboratory Sequence: Volume III
-Separations and Analysis, Dr. Good has
written more than 100 technical publica-
tions and articles on science policy and
research management. She received a
B.S. in chemistry from the University of
Central Arkansas and her M.S. and Ph.D.
in chemistry from the University of Ar-
kansas. Dr. Good's contributions to her
field have earned her numerous awards,
including the National Science Founda-
tion Distinguished Public Service Award,
the Industrial Research Institute Medal-
ist Awards, and the American Association
for the Advancement of Science Award.
Louis J. Lanzerotti. Dr. Lanzerotti has
been involved in geophysics and space
physics research since he joined AT&T
Bell Laboratories in 1965, where he is
presently a Distinguished Member of
Technical Staff. He is also an Adjunct
Professor in Electrical Engineering at the
University of Florida. Dr. Lanzerotti has
served on numerous government science
committees, including the NASA Advisory
Council, Chairman of NASA's Space and
Earth Science Advisory Committee, the
Advisory Committee on the Future of the
U.S. Space Program, and the Space Stud-
ies Board of the National Research Coun-
cil; he is currently Chairman of the
Council's Space Studies Board. He has
received NASA's Distinguished Public
Service Medal. He has been elected to
membership in the National Academy of
Engineering and the International Acad-
emy of Astronautics. He is a Fellow of the
American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science, the American Geophysi-
cal Union, and the American Physical
Society. Dr. Lanzerotti's research activi-
ties focus on planetary magnetospheres,
energetic particles emitted by the Sun,
and the impacts of space processes on
space and terrestrial technologies. Dr.
Lanzerotti served as an elected member
of the Harding Township, NJ School
Board from 1982-1990, and is presently
an elected Committeeman on the
Township's governance body. He received
an undergraduate degree in engineering
from the University of Illinois and his
A.M. and Ph.D degrees in physics from
Harvard. Dr. Lanzerotti has reported on
his research in 300 technical articles and
is coauthor or coeditor of three books.
William E. Lilly. Mr. Lilly is an inde-
pendent consultant currently working
with the National Academy of Public Ad-
ministration. In performing studies for
the Academy he specializes in aerospace
and aeronautical management issues. Ex-
amples of the projects he has completed
for the Academy include the Study of the
Cost and Financing of the Commercially
Developed Space Facility," and a "Review
of the Centers for the Commercial Devel-
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opment of Space: Concept and Opera-
tions." Mr. Lilly retired from NASA in
1981 following a government career that
also included service in the Department
of the Navy, and the National Bureau of
Standards. From 1967 until the time of
his retirement, he was the Comptroller at
NASA Headquarters responsible for the
planning, analysis, and control of the to-
tal agency resources. While with NASA
he also served as the Assistant Adminis-
trator for Administration and was the Di-
rector of Program Control for the Office of
Manned Space Flight during the develop-
ment of the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo
programs. Mr. Lilly was awarded two
NASA Distinguished Service Medals, two
NASA Exceptional Service Medals, and
two Executive Performance Awards. Ad-
ditionally, he was designated with the
Presidential Rank of Distinguished Ex-
ecutive. He received a B.S. degree in
public administration and completed a
year of graduate work in public adminis-
tration at the University of California-
Berkeley.
Duane T. McRuer. Mr. McRuer is the
President and Technical Director of Sys-
tems Technology, Inc., an engineering
consulting firm he cofounded in 1957. As
a prime contractor and consultant to the
U.S. government and private industry,
Systems Technology, Inc. conducts re-
search and development programs in ter-
restrial, astronautical, and aeronautical
vehicle dynamics, guidance and control
systems, human operator dynamics, and
associated topics. Mr. McRuer's research
on control systems engineering has led to
five patents. He is a member of the Na-
tional Academy of Engineering and has
served as a member and Chairman of the
National Research Council's Aeronautics
and Space Engineering Board, and as a
member of the Council's Committee on
Human Exploration of Space. He cur-
rently serves on the NASA Advisory
Council and has participated on Commit-
tees involving aeronautics, space station
engineering design issues, and the Com-
mercially Developed Space Facility. Mr.
McRuer is a Fellow of five professional so-
cieties, including the American Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Science, the
American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, the Institute of Electrical
and Electronic Engineers, the Human
Factors and Ergonomics Society, the Soci-
ety of Automotive Engineers, and the
American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science. He has written seven
books, including Aircraft Dynamics and
Automatic Control, and Analysis of Non-
linear Control Systems published widely
in his field and has written two books on
aircraft dynamics and on nonlinear con-
trol systems. He is a Distinguished
Alumnus of the California Institute of
Technology, where he received a B.S. in
engineering and an M.S. in electrical en-
gineering.
George D. Nelson. A former NASA as-
tronaut, Dr. Nelson participated in three
space shuttle missions, including a
spacewalk to retrieve and repair a space
science satellite. He is currently affili-
ated with the University of Washington
where he serves as the Assistant Provost,
Associate Professor of Astronomy and of
Education, and as Associate Director of
the Washington Space Grant College Pro-
gram. Before joining the astronaut corps
in 1978, Dr. Nelson was a Research Asso-
ciate at the Joint Institute for Laboratory
Astrophysics and had been an astronomer
at the University of Gottingen in Ger-
many and the University of Utrecht in
the Netherlands. He graduated from
Harvey Mudd College with a B.S. in phys-
ics with honors and distinction, and re-
ceived an M.S. and Ph.D. in astronomy
from the University of Washington. Dr.
Nelson serves as a trustee of the Analyti-
cal Services, Inc. and is on the Board of
Directors of the Art Institute of Seattle,
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the Associationof SpaceExplorers, and
the Washington State BiotechnologyAs-
sociation. He has servedon NASA Task
Forceson SpaceStation FreedomOpera-
tions and on the SpaceTelescopeRepair
Mission, and wasa technicaladvisor to
the both the Synthesis Groupon
America's SpaceExploration Initiative
and the National Commissionon Space.
Dr. Nelsonwas selectedasa Fellow of the
American Council on Educationand re-
ceivedthe Haley SpaceFlight Award
from the American Institute of Aeronau-
tics and Astronautics. His awardsfrom
NASA include the ExceptionalEngineer-
ing AchievementMedal, the Exceptional
ServiceMedal, and three Spaceflight
Medals.
Bradford W. Parkinson. The original
program director of the Defense
Department's Global Positioning Satellite
system, Dr. Parkinson has a broad back-
ground in guidance, control,
astrodynamics, simulation, avionics, navi-
gation, and software engineering. He is
currently a professor of aeronautics and
astronautics at Stanford University
where he also functions as the Program
Manager of the NASA Gravity Probe B
spacecraft intended to verify Einstein's
Theory of General Relativity.
Dr. Parkinson is also leading a Stanford
research group that is developing innova-
tive uses of the Global Positioning Satel-
lite for aviation applications. He is a
distinguished graduate of the Air Com-
mand and Staff College and the U.S. Na-
val War College. He graduated with a
B.S. in engineering from the U.S. Naval
Academy and received his M.S. and Ph.D.
in aeronautics and astronautics from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and Stanford. Dr. Parkinson was elected
to the National Academy of Engineering
and is a Fellow of the Royal Institute of
Navigation and the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics. He was
awarded the Royal Institute of
Navigation's Gold Medal and has received
the Kirschner Award from the Institute of
Electrical and Electronic Engineers.
Dr. Parkinson has authored more than 50
papers on the subjects of guidance, navi-
gation, and control.
Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Dr. Seamans is
a Senior Lecturer in the Department of
Aeronautics and Astronautics at the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology. Dur-
ing his professional career, he has served
in numerous senior level positions in the
government, including Associate Adminis-
trator and Deputy Administrator of
NASA, Secretary of the Air Force, and the
first Administrator of the Energy Re-
search and Development Administration.
Dr. Seamans is actively involved on the
governing boards of a number of profes-
sional societies and institutions including
the Boston Museum of Science, the Na-
tional Geographic Society, the New En-
gland Medical Center, Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution, and the
Carnegie Institution of Washington. He
has served as the President of the Na-
tional Academy of Engineering, chaired
the National Research council's Commit-
tee on the Space Station, was Vice Chair-
man of the Steering Committee for
NASA's Synthesis Group on the Space
Exploration Initiative, and is the Chair-
man Emeritus of the NASA Alumni
League. Among his many honors are the
Robert H. Goddard Memorial Trophy,
NASA's Distinguished Service Medal, the
Department of Defense Distinguished
Public Service Medal, and the USAF
Space Trophy. Dr. Seamans is a graduate
of Harvard and received an M.S. and Doc-
tor of Science degree from the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology.
Leon T. Silver. Dr. Silver is the W.M.
Keck Foundation Professor for Resource
Geology at California Institute of Tech-
nology. Among his principal research in-
terests are the understanding of natural
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resources in relation to continental evolu-
tion, tectonics of western America and
Mexico, and petrology of meteorites and
planetary evolution. He is Past President
and a Fellow of the Geological Society of
America, and a fellow of the Mineralogi-
cal Society of America, and the American
Association for the Advancement of Sci-
ence. Dr. Silver was elected to the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences and served as
a member of the Council of the Academy
and on the governing Board of the Na-
tional Research Council. He serves as the
Chairman of the Advisory Committee to
the Office of Basic Energy Sciences of the
Department of Energy and was a member
of the Steering Committee of the NASA
Synthesis Group which evaluated mission
scenarios for the President's Space Explo-
ration Initiative. During the Apollo pro-
gram, Dr. Silver played a major role in
instructing the astronauts in lunar geol-
ogy, as well as designing several surface
geology experiments. Dr. Silver received
the Award for Professional Excellence
from the American Institute of Profes-
sional Geologists, and was presented with
NASA's Exceptional Service Medal. His
undergraduate and graduate degrees are
in civil engineering and geology, and he
received a Ph.D. in geology and geochem-
istry from the California Institute of
Technology.
Albert D. Wheelon. In 1988, Dr.
Wheelon retired as the Chief Executive
Officer and Chairman of the Board of the
Hughes Aircraft Company. He is a
trustee of the California Institute of Tech-
nology, The Aerospace Corporation, and
The Rand Corporation. Dr. Wheelon also
participates on committees involving the
government's national laboratories in-
cluding the University of California
President's Council on the National Labo-
ratories, the Director's National Security
Advisory Board for Los Alamos National
Laboratory, and the Director's Advisory
Committee of the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory. He also serves on
the Board of Overseers for the Supercon-
ducting Supercollider Project. From
1983-1988 he was a member of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board. In 1986 he was a member of the
Presidential Commission to Investigate
the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident.
Dr. Wheelon was the Deputy Director for
Science and Technology of the Central In-
telligence Agency from 1962-1966. He is
a Fellow of the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers and the American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.
He was also elected to the National Acad-
emy of Engineering, and the Council on
Foreign Relations. He earned an under-
graduate degree in engineering from
Stanford and a Ph.D. in physics from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Biographies of
Ex Officio Members
Karl H. Doetsch. As Director General of
the Space Station program in the Cana-
dian Space Agency, Dr. Doetsch is respon-
sible for Canada's contribution of the
Mobile Servicing System to the interna-
tional space station program. He has fol-
lowed a varied career in the aerospace
sector, both in aeronautics and in space
flight. He was the final project manager
on the orbiter's remote manipulator sys-
tem, Canadarm, the first Director of
Canada's astronaut program, and Associ-
ate Director of the National Aeronautical
Establishment of the National Research
Council. He is a Fellow and former presi-
dent of the Canadian Aeronautics and
Space Institute, a Fellow of the Cana-
dian Academy of Engineering, and a Vice
President of the International Astronauti-
cal Federation. He has been a recipient
of the Royal Society of Canada Thomas
Eadie Award and the NASA Public Ser-
vice Award. Dr. Doetsch received his
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bachelorof sciencedegreein engineering,
and his DIC and Ph.D. from Imperial Col-
lege, London University.
Fredrik Engstrom. Born Karlskrona,
Sweden, in 1939, Fredrik Engstrom re-
ceived his Masters Degree in 1964 and
his Doctorate in 1971 from Stockholm
University. He started his career as
Project Manager with the space Technol-
ogy Group, where he was mainly involved
in managing sounding rocket launchings.
Between 1965 and 1970 he was an Euro-
pean Space Research Organization Fellow
at Culham Laboratories, and a Research
Assistant at the Stockholm where he was
involved in space projects. During his
term of office, from 1972 to 1985, as
President of the Swedish Space Corpora-
tion he was behind the decision to under-
take the first Swedish satellite project,
Viking, and later, the Nordic Spacecraft
Tele-X, for direct broadcasting and busi-
ness communications. He was also a
Board member of the Kiruna Geophysical
Institute. It was largely due to his initia-
tive that a daughter company of the
Swedish Space Corporation, the Satellite
Image Corporation in Kruna, was set in
1982. In parallel with his activities as
president of the Swedish Space Corpora-
tion, he was also Chairman of the Board
of the daughter company until 1985. Dr.
Engstrom has been closely linked with
the European Space Agency prior to his
appointment in 1985: From 1977 to 1979
he was Chairman of ESA's Remote Sens-
ing Programme Board and from 1979 to
1985 Swedish Delegate to the Agency's
Council.
Luciano Guerriero. Professor
Guerriero has been the President of the
Italian Space Agency (ASI) since 1988.
Previously, since 1980, he had the respon-
sibility of the Italian National Space Pro-
gram (PSN/CNR). In this framework he
developed several space projects in coop-
eration with other space agencies and, in
particular, with NASA. At present, he is
also the head of the Italian delegation of
the European Space Agency (ESA). Dur-
ing his professional career, he has been
leading Italian research groups as part of
large international cooperations in the
field of High Energy Particle Physics con-
ducting experimental activities at Padua
and Bari Universities in Italy and at na-
tional and international laboratories such
as Brookhaven National Laboratory,
Fermi Lab, and CERN. Since 1968 he
has been a full professor of General Phys-
ics at Bari University, where he has been
Director of the Physics Department. He
has also served in numerous government
committees in Italy in particular as Vice-
President of the Italian National Institute
for Nuclear Physics (INFN) and as Direc-
tor of the Institute for Signal and Image
Processing of the Italian National Re-
search Council.
Shigebumi Saito. Dr. Saito was born
in Tokyo, Japan, on September 17, 1919.
He received his bachelor degree in 1941,
and a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering in
1951 from the University of Tokyo. Dur-
ing World War II, he did research on mi-
crowave radar systems for the Naval
Technical Institute of Japan and was ap-
pointed as an associate professor at the
University of Tokyo in 1947. Dr. Saito
conducted research at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology as a Fulbright
Fellow, where he worked on the measure-
ment of electron-beam noise and VHF
low-noise tubes. He later returned to the
University of Tokyo and was engaged in
research on microwave and laser applica-
tions to the electronics field. He was also
a professor at the Institute of Space and
Aeronautical Science. Dr. Saito served as
the Director, the National Space Devel-
opment Agency (NASDA) of Japan from
1969 to 1974, and was appointed as a
member of the Space Activities Commis-
sion of Japan. He retired from the Uni-
versity of Tokyo in 1980 where he retains
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the titled as professor emeritus. He was
then promoted as Commissioner of the
Space Activities Commission of Japan,
and later appointed High Commissioner,
a position he held until 1991. Dr. Saito is
a member and a past Chairman of the
Radio Technical Council, and is the
Chairman of the Telecommunications
Technology Council. Since 1991 he has
been the Chairman of Japan Interna-
tional Space Year (ISY) Association. He
has served as the Vice President of the
International Astronautical Federation
and was also the President of the Insti-
tute of Electronics and Communication
Engineers of Japan. He is a Fellow of the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics En-
gineers and served as served of the Edito-
rial Board of the IEEE's Spectrum
magazine. Among his many honors, Dr.
Saito received the Commendation Award
from Minister of Posts and Telecommuni-
cations, the Imperial Award from the Ja-
pan Institute of Invention and
Innovation, the Distinguished Service
Award from the Institute of Electronics
and Communication Engineers of Japan,
the Prime Minister's Award of World
Communications Year, the NHK Broad-
casting Culture Award, and the Imperial
Purple Ribbon Medal. He also received
the Telecom Week Award from Minister
of Posts and Telecommunications, and
was decorated the Order of the Sacred
Treasure, Gold and Silver Star.
Special Assistants to the
Advisory Committee
Virginia E. Durgin. Ms. Durgin is a
Group Chief for the Central Intelligence
Agency responsible for contracting activi-
ties and the career development of pro-
curement professionals. She serves as a
member of the Agency's Procurement
Policy Panel. Prior to returning to the
Central Intelligence Agency in 1982, she
served as Contracts Manager for the
Western Union telegraph Company, and
as Director of Contracts for Xontech. Ms.
Durgin received her bachelor's degree
from Asbury College, Wilmore, Kentucky
and did graduate work at Ohio State Uni-
versity and at California State Univer-
sity.
Mark Werfel. Mr. Werfel began his ca-
reer as Presidential Management Intern,
and has worked for each military depart-
ment in a progressive series of opera-
tional and Headquarters positions. He
currently serves as a U.S. Army informa-
tion systems acquisition manager. He
has been responsible for the resolution of
many of the major contracting issues of
the past decade, such as shipbuilding
claims, spare parts pricing, defense in-
dustrial modernization incentives and im-
proving the focus of Government
acquisition organizations on its customers
needs. Mr. Werfel is a 1985 graduate of
the Air War College resident program,
and holds a Bachelors Degree in Econom-
ics from Brooklyn College and a Masters
Degree in Business Administration from
Troy State University. His position on
defense industrial base policy was pub-
lished in "Defense News" on June 14,
1993.
Committee Support
John J. McCarthy, Committee Executive
Secretary
Kathryn C. Cappello, Committee Execu-
tive Assistant
Lewis L. Peach, Jr., Technical
Terri Ramlose, Technical Editing
Alan Ladwig, Technical Editing
Todd F. McIntyre, Technical Editing
Pamela R. Barnes, Administrative
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APPENDIX B
White House Budget Target Summary
April 3, 1993
Space Station Development Budget Options 1994-1998
Option 1: $5 billion total (1994-1998)
$1.0 billion peak annual funding (1995-1998)
Option 2: $7 billion total (1994-1998)
$1.5 billion peak annual funding (1995-1998)
Option 3: $9 billion total (1994-1998)
$1.8 billion peak annual funding (1995-1998)
(To meet the President's new technology investment goals, this
option would require NASA to propose $2 billion in reductions
from the remainder of its 1994-1998 budget.)
The budget totals include:
Development
Operations
Utilization
Facilities
Shuttle integration
Research operations support
Transition costs
- Enhanced early flight research
- Adequate program reserves
The budget totals do not include shuttle operations and civil service salaries and re-
lated support costs.
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APPENDIX C
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 30, 1993
Dear Chuck:
Thank you for your letter of April 9 requesting a statement of the Administration's
first-level objectives for the space station and its strategic goals for the civil space program.
I have attached our first-level objectives for the space station and look forward to discussing
them with you and hearing how they were received by the Advisory, Committee. As the
Administration is currently formulating its strategic goals for the civil space program, I am
not able to send you a definitive answer to that question. I would like, however, to share
with you some preliminary observations on the subject.
The President's 1994 budget demonstrates this Administration's strong commitment to
the civil space program. In the future, we will work to ensure that all the resources dedicated
to the civilian space program are well-managed and focused on issues that are critical to the
nation. First, the space program should create new knowledge that will contribute to our
understanding of our environment and of our place in the universe. Space systems, with their
unique vantage point, provide an indispensable tool for understanding how human actions
influence the complex workings of our planet. Similarly, space science and robotic planetary
exploration can provide us with otherwise unobtainable knowledge and insights regarding both
our home planet and the universe in which we live. Research that expands the bounds of our
technology can also provide new capabilities that contribute to our economic strength.
The space program can also make an important contribution to the U.S. economy.
Prudent, industry-led investments in aeronautics and space research can provide important
assistance to the aerospace industry and to other industries, which can, in turn, make
significant contributions to the U.S. economy. For example, past government/industry
cooperation in aeronautics and in satellite communications has helped to achieve and sustain
U.S. leadership in these critical areas.
International cooperation in space activities can help the international community move
beyond the Cold War. Working with our existing partners in Europe, Japan, and Canada, and
with Russia and other parts of the emerging democratic world, we can forge additional
relationships that contribute to global peace and prosperity. International cooperation in space
science, exploration, and commerce can provide an important lesson on how nations, working
together, define challenges and solve problems that no one nation alone could accomplish.
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The spaceprogram also has an important role in helping to generate and sustain
interest in math and science education. The excitement generated by the space program can
be used to interest young people in math and science education. This interest can not only
help create the scientists, engineers, and educators that are the key to the future economic
competitiveness of our nation, but also increase the understanding of science and technology
by tomorrow's adults -- a critical need for the continued strength of our democracy.
Finally, human space flight is and will continue to be a significant element of our
domestic and international space program. Humans can make a unique contribution, as part
of a balanced program of robotic and human exploration, to our scientific and technical
knowledge, as well as our understanding of the benefits and limitations of humans living and
working in space.
I hope these brief thoughts will be useful in helping you to focus your work. I look
forward to discussing these issues with you and to receiving the final guidance from the
Advisory Committee.
Sincerely,
Dr. Charles M. Vest
President
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Attachment
cc: Greg Simon
Bowman Cutter
Leon Panetta
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SPACE STATION PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
O Create the capability to perform significant long-duration space research in
materials and life sciences:
As measured by, for instance: power and other resources available to
payloads; experimental racks and other user equipment; crew time for
research activity; microgravity level; experiment duration; and utility for
research between crew visits.
0 Develop the technology and the engineering skills necessary to build and operate
advanced human and autonomous space systems:
The construction of the space station is an engineering and technology
development effort that provides a worthy challenge for our national
technical talents.
o Encourage international cooperation in science and technology:
Retain participation by the current international partners; consider, but not
limit, redesign options to those accommodating Russian participation.
0 Provide opportunity for new users, particularly industry users, to conduct
experiments on new, commercially relevant products and processes;
Fully utilize existing aerospace industry capabilities and products where
sensible; ease entry by non-traditional space users.
0 Acquire new knowledge regarding the feasibility and desirability of conducting
human scientific, commercial, and exploration activities:
The value of future commercial and scientific space station facilities and
the practicality of the future human exploration of the solar system
depends, in large measure, on the effectiveness of humans in space, and
on the effect that long-term presence in space will have on their health
and their capabilities.
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APPENDIX D
Space Station Capabilities Matrix
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USERPOW1ER(OP,_AVG) )GN 30(1,2) 6.1 7 161 31 12.1 8.5 40.6 40.3 47,6124.2 37+2/t3.8 55.2/26.1
30 DAY IdAX. CONI'MSI,.K:4,1S POWI_ ION 18.$ 16.5 38 45,8 19 10 69 58 54120 49129 87/37
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :._::::-":*':**::-'::1:::_11
TOTAL _ VCX.LIIdE CUSM 63(SL) 110 481 760 03(SL) 210 680 878 736 1117 1117
SYS'I1EM _ # 2($L) 7 31 58 2(SL) 11 41 65 24.5 50.6 505
U_E_I:L4CI_ • 36 W/ IP_1.5) 6($L) 6 36 311 6(SL), 16 48.5 45.5 40 72 72
UNITFr)STATESUSERRACKS • II • HTC(1.5) 8_SL) 9 23 23 6(SL] 16 31 28 40 84 64
USeR RACKS _1_1 • .... PC)RD_I.8_ 7(SL) 910 20/0 6 4($L} 0/16 21116 20113 30 40 4¢
USER RAC.q_ _21_ # .... PORD(1.6_ 6(SL) 910 39/14 36 6(SL} 10/16 36,'31 45126 40 72 7;
OCC4._IED 30 DAY PERICOS AT LVI.H • 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 12 12 1_ I;
NNN NNNN ''+"+:+:: ..........................+.............
CIX*Y_EN (JEWEL % 21(1.7,2.15) 21(O4=18) 21 21 21 21(OR8) 21 21 21 21 21 21
C_2LEVEL % 0.3 0.?_ORB_ 0.52 0.52 06 0+7(ORB) 0_62.0,76 0,52,0+76 0.52 0.6 0.6 0.1_
RELATNE HUMIOITY % 30-70(" 1 30(ORB I 26-70 25-70 25-70 30(O1:18) 25-70 25-70 2S-70 30-70 30-70 30-7(:
C.4B_IPRESSURE _ 14.7('] 14.7(Of18) 14_7 14.7 14.7 14+7(OR8) 14+7 14.7 14,7 14.7 14.7 14,?
COM_LINICA'noNBI_ I'VRE $ S. Ku S, Ku S. Ku, UHF $ S, Ku S, Ku, UHF, S, Ku, UHF S, Ku $.lOJ S, Ku
COMMUNICATION UPUNK EPS 72K(t+171 S-72K S-72K S-72K S-72K S-72K
COMMLINIC&TIONDOWNLINK EPS 60M((1.151 S-192K S-192K, Ku.SOM S-192K S-102K. Ku-SOM S-162K. Ku-:30M
VIDEO_ ICHN, INELS 111(1.14/161 0/0 014 014 0/4 010 0/41 014J 0/4 012 012 0/2
I I
i
VI_ D_ CC_S_K31N ICHANNEL_ 6(1.14) 0 4 4 4 0 0| 0 0 0 0 0
_ _'_.'_..._:_m::_:_$_$_:'.....:_$_¢?@_ _'_$_$_$._$:_:':_:_:_:_:_:_:_ !?.._.'._ _._i "._:P:_":: - :_:_"_i_ _'._@-_:i
P/L DATA MANN31EM ENT COMPUTER Y/N YES_1,111 YES(SIL l +VIES YI_ _ YES{SL) '_S +YES YE_ _ _ES
ON BOAP.,D DATA STOP.N3E MBYrEs 40 120 120 120 640 1280 1280 1280 441 441 441
TOTAL UNE$ OF CC)C)E (NOT INCL LP.) # 232K 40SK 435K 402K 431K 1220K 1220K 1372K' 232K 232K 232K
EXTERNAL £111ES • 4(1.2) 4 10; 17 21 2 15! 15 4 14 14
EXTERNAL PAYI.0AD _ _ N.R,W.Z(1.23) N,R,W,Z N,R,W,Z I N,R,W,Z N.R.W,Z N.R N,R.W,Z N,R,W,Z N,R,W,Z N,FLW,Z N,R,W,Z N.R.W,Z
oP'nCN. IMNOOWS •-SIZE 1-20"(I,27) 0 1-6" 1-6" 1.6" 0 1.6" 1-8" 2-6" 4.6" 4-6" 4.6"
+.-.m.++:.:::m:+::::::::::::::::::::: 6 ::,:.._:m.::+++..-..++:+:&::...+:++.+'.+w_
:_+_+_ +_++:_+_!+i+::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ":"::':':':':::._:_:'::::::":.<_ _:_: "
TOTALPOWE_R 10N 76(G(1_10,4.§_._ _._ _::_-'::'_:::::":::::: :::::::":::::li ':::l'."_i_i_i_ :':'i_i-:::_i_i_i'_-::_'i_i_._i_:'.'_._._:....7.S:'i_i'_iii##_i_'_,:_i_ 75
++!+!::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::................ ++++:+++++
"Solar Ir_rlal/t.VLH "*'Ooee no( Indude ACRV .... 0+3% CO2 is ichlev=_e on I periodic basis =s required
"* Power re.abort to 123+1-03V on I dlar_els .... Without/With 1he Orbiter I
B
I I I
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ASSEMBLY, OPERATIONS AND SAFETY PARAMETERS
_ zusaF__q_-u_ Y/OUll:II"TING FLIGHTS
LAUNCH VEHICLE I"Vl:E
CtAIAA.AllVE/t,,q_EM eLY EVA MANHR8
I   mllllll INNN
Fa Jul_q OF L _ __nt',_rlCS _ FLTSHR
_TIONS CREW H(XJRS
MAINTENANCE CREW _ EVA4VA MA,NHR_'YR
OI_BITIg_ MA'riNO GI_AIBIUIY _QUDUN.
unm z: 1RN48POR11_ Y/N
_...nl__F,_qlT.DATA (_gPLAY Y/N
PA____n,_r___ OPEPJB.E L__aqED Y/N
_rATION OPERNBLE _ Y/N
 NNN
S_=E HCI.D _
SAFE HAVEN 1MnE
CPk'W E,.qCN_ YIN
ACRV m-TYI_
RRE _ AUTO/MAN
RRE _ AUTO/MAN
8TRN. CAUTION AND WARNING SYS. YIN
CREW _ OVERRIOES OF C,RIT. SY_ Y/N
I I I I I l
.m_J__mF, MEMT OPTION A1 OPTION II
(R['Q REfl Fe H'r¢ IHi"¢ i PHO
m
Iq HTC inTO
2i 5 17 20
SI.AJI"rLE 9HuI"rLE StAn't_ SHUTTLE SFAn'rl.E i _ SH_Trl.E
40 64 154 224 44 159 294 311
0-1 1-2 2-3 6" 0-1! 1-2 I-2 $"
14 122 134 226 14 122 134 226
3510 125/t68 143/199 1671543 35/0 1751174 ll)3/223 253/635
DUAL(2.23) 9E_Z]LE m_OI.E _ DUAL _ DUAL S_GI.JE SSNI3UE
NO NO NO NO _ _ M_S ME5
YES(3.5) MES _ _B M_ M_ YES YES
YES _56 MBS MD8 MRS MES _ _ES
_B _I_ _ES _ MW _ES M_
2(2.29) 3 3 3* 3* 2.! 2-,. 2÷ 2*
NIA NIA NIA ACRV NIA NIA NIA N_OES
YES(2.|) YES YES _ MI_ '_9 'VIES _ YES
(2.7) MJTO(ORS) AUTO AUTO N,rPo ;UTO(ORS) NJTO AUTO AUTO
(2.7) MAN(ORB) _,UTO/MAN kUTCVMAN _,u'roAIN_I I_R8) _UTO/MAN _,UTO/k4AN _,UTCVMAN
YES(1.13,2.6) _ 'VIES _S _ WS(O_ _ YES _S
yss,(2.5)_ _ _ '_s VEs(oRel _ _s
ASRM _ i_lilil_e
OPTION C
Pt4FC ImP I_C
3 0
0 12 24
5 S' 5'
226 249 246
501430 68/479 80146§
DUAL DUN. DUAL
NO NO I,_
M_ 'fEB 'V_
MW
2 2 2
_,UTO/MAN _U'TO_IAN _UTO_AN
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INTERNATIONAL PARAMETERS
1 I
PARAMETERS UNITS REQUIREMENt OPTION A OPTION B OPTION C
28.8 DEGREE INCLINATION REG (PARA) IHTC PHC IHTC PHC IPHP PHC
JEM ACCOMMODATION
DEVEL_ COST ADHEREM::_ H/M/L HIC-IH M k_ M M L
OPERATIONS COST SAVINGS H/M/L HIGH H N M M k_ !,
SCHEDU_E _ H/M/L HIC.-Pt H H M M L
:_.._._..,_._._."_._._:'._ _ _$_:$:'.:'&_::_.:$->..>&_- _$_',_ __":"-::::::"._-:_ >-_-'-_,_'$_.:-:_i$:-".".:-"_:_" _._'-_,_-_._ _':_ _"-_".::::>,:;:_ _:.<:_:_ _:: _.:: _::_: ::::::: :::::: :::_k_ _.:_._: _ _,_%:_!i_iii_!.::
___._!_!_!_!_..<_i_:_:i_::_:_i_ii_:ii_:_!:`::_:_:._:.`._..`._`:`_._ _!:'$_::'_:_:::_ _'_._._. _.-'._._::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.._:_.:.:_.:.:_._:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:._:.:-:.:.:.:.:.:.:,:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.._:.
SYSTEM POWER (CREW#dO CREW kW/kW
USER POWER (MAXJYEARLY AVG.*) kWlkW
JEM RACKS (TOTAL/RACKS @ < l_g) # / #
JEM EF P/L (TOTAL/SITES @<lp.g) #/#
DATACOMM. (UPLINI,_X)WNLINK) KBPS/MBPS
5.7/4 5,714 5.7/4 5.714 5.7/4 5.7/4 5.714
14/3.84 14/2.9 14/4 14/3.8; 14/4.9 14/2.5 14/2.5
10/5 10/5 10/5 10/! 10/5 10/1 10/1
10/5 10/2 10/2 10/. _ 10/5 10/1 10/1
72/50 72//50 72150 72150 72/50 72/50 72t50
:.%.:.:.>:.:.:.:_-._:_._:_._...< , ..............................
MODULE INTEGRITY HIM/L HIGH MI H H H L L
APMACCOM.OOA,_O. 1 I
: _.x.._.'.,-_.:-_.._.-..,._,._ _:$_8_:_._>.'¢_-.'_:_::_:..x_:.-..._:._._:._:_SN_:_-_k_:.,..'..-.:,_.-.-.-._.-,,:,-_: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::: :.%x...-.-_%...-..x::::_N:
:+:.:..... ....:.+:.. ================================================================================================================================================================================:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::
DEVELOPMENT OOST ADHERENCE H / M / L HIGH M M H H_ L L
OPERATIONS COST SAVINGS. HtM/L HIGH H H M M M M
/
SCHEDULE ADHERENCE H/M/L HIGH HI. HI M M H H
SYSTEM POWER (CREW4gO CREW kW/kW: 5.9/3.7 5.9/3.7 5.9/3.7J 5,9/3.7 5.9/3.7 3/3 5.9/3.7
USER POWER (MAXJYEARLY AVG." kWtkW 12/3.84 /3.6 12/3.84 12/3.84; 12/3.84 /2.4 12/3.84
RACKS (TOTAL/RACKS @ <71_) #/# 2111 11111 11111 11/11 11/11 11/11 11/1
DATA COMM. (UPLINK/[:X)WNLINK KBPS/MBPS 72/50 72/50 72150 72/50 72/50J_ 72/50' 72/5C
:_.:_.<_._`<.._i_:_:_:_:.<:_>:.<::::.<:>.:`<::::::`:.:_:_::::>_<_::_ :_.:-_.:_._:_::::$,<::>._:::::.<$_:::::::.<:_>_.:._:::::-.'::::::_ _:_:_:_::_:.<:_.<:_<..:$::_,<_<::$._::$:::::::::_;.<:::;._:::;,:$_:::::::._:::::_:.:::._.':_._:.< _::._._._.%_._._._.:_:.<:.-:_
MOOULE INTEGRITY H/M/L| HIGH Mt H; M H1 L L
_ _s.cco.,,,oo..,-r,o.i ! [ 1
f:.:.*._.::_.%.N::_'._,'_'..<,._._.._::':_:_::::_ _."._::_2_I::_::_;:::_:.<::_<:_.::.:_:':Ng::::::::N:::N::_:::g:_N:_:_N:_N52_:_::. ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
_2_diiii:ii_ij_i2_ii:_ii _ij_:i_ii_ii_ii:i_!iii,i_ti_i:_:_: 2_ii,ii,iiiiiii,i, i i,i:_ i iiiiiiii,iiiiiiyiil l l ili2 iiiiiiili_ i ii,i,iii,iii_iii_iiiiii _iiii iii l_iiiiiii_
_TCO,,_._,_c_ .1,1_ =1._5_ ,.| ,_| . . _ •
_:, :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
MSS MAINTENANCE FEASIBILITY YES/NO N:)'[ N:)[ YES YES] ND ND
POWER(PEAK/KEEPALNE) kW 5.411.2 5.411.2 5.4/1.2 5.411.2 5.411.2 TBD 'TBO
PAYLOAD RACKS L # 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
c_,,.,.OC,Tio,,,l' ,,,O,','R/ 1._-I 1.5[ 1.5 1.5 1.5/ 1.5[ 1.5
::__":_ ::."_:_:_::::.<.'_i_.'i:_ :.'-':._:.*_:_:__ _-'::..:.':.::::.':.:.':.'-':.:._.'.':.__:_: _ N:_ :::::__:_2 _:_: _2 _ _.:_::__: _ _:::_:_: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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APPENDIX E
Glossary of Cost Terms
Funding Lines for the Redesign Options
ACRV (Assured Crew Return Vehicle)
Provision of ACRV's to enable crew to permanently inhabit the space station.
ALLOCATED COSTS
Allocated costs cover the Small Business Innovative Research program set-aside
percentage tax, the allocated costs of contract administration for NASA programs
which the DCMC administers, some internal taxes (Center Director's Discretionary
Fund), and the program mission support/research operations support which enable
the NASA field centers to provide a basic level of housekeeping, engineering shop
support and ADP services.
APA (Allowance for Program Adjustment)
Allowance for Program Adjustment covers items beyond the control of the program
manager, such as changes in scope, reductions in the approved level of funding for
the program, major changes in interfaces (e.g., performance changes in the launch
vehicle causing a substantial redesign); in addition, APA has had inaccurate or
biased/misleading information.
DEVELOPMENT
Provides for the design, development, testing, and production of test hardware and
software, flight hardware and software, ground systems for operations, and integra-
tion and verification.
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FACILITIES
Provides new brick and mortar construction or modifications to existing facilities.
INSTITUTIONAL
Provides for contract audit services, institutional research operations support, center
project management support, and mandated agency "taxes," e.g., small business and
innovative research.
FincaReport
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OPERATIONS
Provides for the operations of the space station including: launch package checkout
and processing, initial lay-in and follow-on spares, logistics and resupply, ground
control operations, and sustaining engineering.
PAYLOADS
Provides for the design, development, and operations of NASA material and life
sciences experiments and payloads, commercial/technology payloads, and en-
hanced use of Mir. International payloads are launched in the FY 00 timeframe.
Out-year payloads are budgetary figures only.
RESERVES
Reserves covers the inherent risk in any estimate that there will be "make-work"
changes, or that the schedule for accomplishing given tasks will take longer than
expected, or that the underlying economics of the contractor's business base will
change (not dramatically, but to a reasonable level of business base fluctuation), or
that the materials/subcontracts prices will increase.
SCHEDULE ADJUSTMENT
Any calculated bottom-line set-over of the detailed baseline estimate.
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TERMINATION
Provision for any anticipated contract termination or transition costs.
TRANSPORTATION
Shuttle hardware (e.g., orbiter mods, docking berthing systems) and integration
requirements unique to the space station.
USER SUPPORT
Space Station provided hardware, software, and integration for the payload commu-
nity. Includes the payload operations and integration complex, payload data ser-
vices, science utilization management, elements of lab support equipment, payload
processing, and integration.
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